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POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES,
AGENCIES, AND COURTS: AN ANALYTICAL
AND EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
CHARLES E. DAYE"
In this Article, Professor Daye explores the continued evolution of the
relationships among administrative law judges, administrative agencies,
and courts in North Carolina. First, the Article analyzes recent
amendments to the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act and
to the organic legislation creating the Office of Administrative
Hearings. The most recent legislation augments the institutional role of
administrative law judges, alters the process of agency decision-
making, and, in novel provisions, ties the scope and standard of
judicial review to the disposition the agency makes of the
administrative law judge's decision. This Article assesses the purpose
and prospect of these legislative efforts to achieve a satisfactory balance
between the powers of agencies and the rights of affected citizens.
Second, the Article reports the results of an empirical study of
administrative law cases. This study attempts to examine systematically
how agencies disposed of the decisional recommendations made by
administrative law judges. Additionally, the study analyzes how the
courts have been resolving administrative agency decisions on judicial
review. It finds that patterns of court disposition did not appear to be
dependent on selected variables in the decision-making process (such
as whether the agency accepted or rejected the administrative law
judge's recommended decision, or whether the issues presented were
ones offact or law).
The empirical study tends to explain how citizens could have become
substantially dissatisfied with the overall outcomes of their disputes
with agencies. It documents that citizens challenging agency decisions
in contested cases lost the vast of majority of the time they pursued
cases through the system of administrative adjudication and into the
courts. The study, however, does not support several hypotheses that
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might have been suggested based on intuition about the process or
outcome of administrative decision-making, but provides, at best, only
a weak prediction, if any, of the likely effects the recent changes in
administrative procedure will have on agency decisions or judicial
review for citizens who challenge agency decisions.
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1. OVERVIEW: FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-MAKING AND
ADEQUATE JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
In today's world, administrative agencies are ubiquitous as the
primary means for carrying on the business of government.' For
nearly a half-century, since the enactment of the original judicial
1. See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation
of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 581-84 (1984) (analyzing the
role of the contemporary federal government and pointing out the large extent to which
agencies wield regulatory and adjudicatory power in executing governmental authority).
The states have witnessed a similar growth of administrative agencies and their exercise of
governmental regulatory and adjudicatory authority. See Arthur Earl Bonfield, State Law
in the Teaching of Administrative Law: A Critical Analysis of the Status Quo, 61 TEX. L.
REV. 95,101 (1982). Professor Bonfield notes the following:
[T]he regulatory and benefactory functions actually exercised by the states have
become as pervasive as those of the federal government. The former are at least
as likely to affect people in their daily lives as the latter. Most occupational
licensing and public health, safety, and welfare regulation, for example, occur at
the state level. Grant or benefit programs, such as unemployment insurance or
welfare, are also administered primarily through state administrative processes.
In addition, state agencies are primarily responsible for the administration of
education, land use, and highway regulation.
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review statute in 1953, the North Carolina General Assembly has
been revisiting the means by which administrative agencies operate. I
previously examined the broad range of issues involved in enacting
and interpreting the original Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),
arid discussed extensively the fundamental objectives that legislation
was attempting to achieve.3 Yet, even after the enactment of the
original APA over a quarter-century ago,4 problems involving the
relations between citizens and agencies, perhaps never easy to
resolve, have continued to come to the attention of legislators with
sufficient frequency and credibility to induce several additional
legislative efforts. The General Assembly has continually tried to
create a system that finds both a satisfactory and reasonable balance
between the power of governmental agencies to act and the rights of
citizens who are affected by the actions of those agencies.
This Article has two basic purposes: first, it examines legislative
efforts that address the relations between citizens and agencies, and
second, it reports the results of an empirical analysis of cases
involving those relationships. The first part of the Article analyzes
the ways in which the General Assembly has modified the evolving
relationships among agencies, administrative law judges ("ALJs"),
and courts by creating, in 1985 and modifying several times
thereafter, a process that involves ALJs as part of the administrative
decision-making system It explores continuing problems concerning
the relationships between agencies and AI_Js on the one hand, and
between agencies and courts on the other. These concerns led the
General Assembly, between 1985 and 2000, to make several
modifications to the statutes governing these relationships. The
measures proved insufficient to allay continuing concerns and
prompted the General Assembly to enact additional measures that
became effective January 1, 2001. These new measures strengthen
2. The original judicial review statute was repealed by the original Administrative
Procedure Act. Act of April 28, 1953, ch. 1094, 1953 N.C. Sess. Laws 1005, 1005-07,
repealed by Act of Apr. 12, 1974, ch. 1331, § 2, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 691,703. For further
legislative history concerning the Administrative Procedure Act, see infra note 4.
3. Charles E. Daye, North Carolina's New Administrative Procedure Act: An
Interpretive Analysis, 53 N.C. L. REv. 833, 896-922 (1975). Although the discussion in the
present Article is limited to judicial review, this Article updates the analysis of judicial
review contained in the earlier article. See generally id. (discussing judicial review under
the original Administrative Procedure Act).
4. Act of Apr. 12, 1974, ch. 1331, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 691 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 150A-1 to -64 (Supp. 1974)), replaced by Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 746, § 1, 1985
N.C. Sess. Laws 987, 987-1011 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150B-1 to -52
(1999 & Supp. 2000)) [hereinafter "the original APA"].
5. See infra Parts II-IV.
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the roles of ALJs and provide for more vigorous judicial oversight.
This Article analyzes the new amendments in order to assess their
likely import.
The second part of this Article reports on results observed in an
empirical study of administrative agency decisions that involved ALJs
as part of the decision-making process.6 The empirical study assesses
the dynamics of administrative adjudication including the behavior of
ALJs, agencies, and courts when one specifies and controls for
selected variables within the process. These observations serve to
highlight some of the factors that fueled continued legislative
attention. The empirical study also provides some insight into the
possible effects the new amendments may have on the new
relationships the General Assembly has mandated.
The relationship between citizens and the administrative process
has been a principal legislative concern. When agency decisions
affect particular identified citizens 7 the General Assembly has
focused on two related problems-agency decision-making in
contested cases and judicial review of agency decisions in those cases.
In the agency decision-making area, the essential problems are
determining the procedures and mechanisms agencies shall use to
make decisions, establishing the substantive and procedural
constraints that will govern agency decision-making, and allocating
decision-making roles between agencies and ALJs.
Agencies, of course, are interested in carrying out the charges the
legislature has laid before them without too much interference and
certainly without the loss of their essential decision-making authority.
Subject to judicial review, an agency's desired decision-making
authority surely must be deemed to include controlling the decisions
about the issues that arise as the agency carries out its duties, or at the
very least, having a major and perhaps decisive role in making these
decisions. This desire is present even when the agency's actions affect
specific citizens.
But countervailing considerations are present. One prime
function of administrative procedure is to assure fair decisions when
particularly affected citizens have a dispute with an agency. In
particular, the General Assembly has expressly attempted to assure
6. See infra Part V.
7. Generally, agency decision-making that affects citizens is broadly referred to as an
"adjudicatory function." State administrative proceedings, however, affecting particular,
identified citizens are called "contested cases." Two other major areas of concern include
the rule-making function and the publication of new rules and decisions. This Article
focuses its analysis solely on the agencies' adjudicatory function.
2001] 1575
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that the same person within the agency does not turn out to be
investigator, prosecutor, and judge-all in the same case. The
original APA that became effective in 1975 implicitly manifested this
concern.' The General Assembly explicitly stated this concern when
it replaced the original APA with the revised APA.9  The revised
APA provides that procedures set forth in the APA "ensure that the
functions of rule making, investigation, advocacy, and adjudication
are not all performed by the same person in the administrative
process." 10
In 1985, the same year it enacted the revised APA, continued
concern about the possible commingling of decision-making functions
within agencies led the General Assembly to establish the Office of
Administrative Hearings ("OAH").u The legislation constituted the
OAH to serve as the State's central panel of administrative law
judges. As an independent, quasi-judicial agency, z the OAH
"provide[s] a source of independent hearing officers" to conduct
administrative hearings and "thereby prevent the commingling of
legislative, executive, and judicial functions in the administrative
process.'
13
8. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-1 to -64 (Supp. 1974), replaced by Act of July 12,
1985, ch. 746, § 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 987, 987-1011 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 150B-1 to -52 (1999 & Supp. 2000)). The concern over the concentration of
power in a single entity is reflected in several APA provisions. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-
23(e) (1999) (stating that hearings must be conducted in an impartial manner); id. § 150A-
32 (disqualifying the hearing officer for bias upon a proper motion); id. § 150A-35
(prohibiting the hearing officer and agency staff from communicating with any party about
a question of law or an issue of fact). See generally Daye, supra note 3, at 885-91
(discussing the power of the hearing officer as well as the ban on ex parte
communications).
9. Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 746, sec. 1, § 150A-1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 987, 987
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1(a) (1999)) (effective Jan. 1, 1986)
[hereinafter "the revised APA"].
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1(a) (1999).
11. Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 746, § 2, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 987, 1011-13 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-750 to -759 (1999 & Supp. 2000)). The OAH
conducts all hearings under article 3 of the revised APA. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 150B-22 to -
37 (1999 & Supp. 2000). However, other hearing officials conduct proceedings under
article 3A and under statutes of agencies that are exempt from the APA. See infra note 36
and accompanying text.
12. The North Carolina Constitution permits quasi-judicial agencies in the executive
branch. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 3, provides:
Judicial powers of administrative agencies. The General Assembly may vest in
administrative agencies established pursuant to law such judicial powers as
may be reasonably necessary as an incident to the accomplishment of the
purposes for which the agencies were created. Appeals from administrative
agencies shall be to the General Court of Justice.
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-750 (1999), amended by Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190, § 2,
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Respecting the matter of judicial review, the essential goal is to
develop a workable and adequate system of external constraint on
agency decisions through judicial oversight when citizens aggrieved
by those decisions seek review. Legislative attention to judicial
review in this state started at least as early as 1953 when the General
Assembly enacted a judicial review statute. 14 Subsequently, judicial
review provisions were incorporated into the original APA. 5
Determining the relationships that should exist between agencies and
courts requires achieving a delicate balance between agency
autonomy and judicial oversight. Because of its dual continuing
concerns about fair agency decision-making and adequate judicial
oversight, the General Assembly has made a substantial adjustment
in judicial review that became effective on January 1, 2001.16 In a
provision that appears to be novel in administrative law
jurisprudence,17 the General Assembly directly linked the scope of
judicial review of contested case decisions to the agency's final
disposition of the ALI's decision. 8 As set forth below, the agency's
final decision remains subject to the "traditional" scope of review if
the agency adopts the AUJ's decision, but the decision will be subject
to de novo review if the agency does not adopt the decision of the
ALJ.19
Fundamentally, the new legislation that became effective
January 1, 2001 changes three areas of administrative law. First, it
augments the institutional position and "stature" of administrative
law judges by constituting them as quasi-judicial officials in the
executive branch. Second, it increases the effect of ALJs' decisions
on agencies without giving ALJs so much power that they effectively
oust agencies of their proper decisional role. Finally, the new
legislation restructures judicial review by giving courts more extensive
review when agencies reject ALs' decisions, while stopping short of
2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546,546-47.
14. See Act of Apr. 28, 1953, ch. 1094, 1953 N.C. Sess. Laws 1005 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to -316 (1974)), replaced by Act of Apr. 12, 1974, ch. 1331, § 2,
1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 691,703.
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-43 to -52 (Supp. 1974) (current version at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 150B-43 to -52 (1999 & Supp. 2000)).
16. Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190,2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546 (codified in scattered
sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. chs. 6, 7A and 150B). Applicable provisions will be cited in
the subsequent discussion. See infra Part IV.
17. Our research could find no jurisdiction or instances in which the scope and
standard of judicial review are determined by the agency's disposition of the ALI's
recommendation.
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(c) (Supp. 2000).
19. See infra Part IV.B-C.
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transforming courts into "super agencies" that usurp statutory powers
of agencies. These changes are analyzed in the three sections that
follow.
II. AUGMENTING THE AUTHORITY AND STATUS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
In addition to the specific provisions in the recent amendments
that enhance the effect of the ALl's decision by directly limiting the
power of the agency to reject it,20 several other provisions in the
recent amendments appear to have either the purpose or the indirect
effect of giving added authority and stature to ALJs within the system
of administrative adjudication. A proposal introduced in the House
of Representatives of the General Assembly would have made the
AL's decision binding on the parties, including the agency involved.2'
That proposal proved too controversial to be enacted. The Joint
Legislative Administrative Oversight Committee's Counsel
concluded that, under existing precedent, the courts "could easily find
that the [proposed bill] would be a permissible exercise of the
General Assembly's authority" under relevant provisions of the state
constitution.' But some opponents argued that binding decisions
would "probably not survive" a constitutional challenge on separation
of powers grounds and, in any event, would undermine valid
gubernatorial executive prerogatives.P2 Accordingly, the provisions
20. See infra Part III.
21. See H.R. 968, v.2, sec. 3, 1999 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1999),
available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/htm1999/bills/AllVersions/House/h968v2.html (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review), reprinted in MARY SHUPING, N.C. GEN.
ASSEM. RESEARCH DIv., CONTESTED CASES UNDER ARTICLE 3 OF THE APA:
BACKGROUND INFORMATION & OPINIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OAH
FINAL DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY, PRESENTED TO THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE OVERSIGHT COMMITrEE at 5-10 (Feb. 17, 2000) (copy
on file with the author) [hereinafter BACKGROUND INFORMATION & OPINIONS]. See
generally Brad Miller, What Were We Thinking: Legislative Intent and the 2000
Amendments to the North Carolina APA, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1657 (2001) (discussing the
legislative history of the 2000 amendments).
22. Memorandum from Karen Cochrane Brown, Committee Counsel, to the Joint
Legislative Administrative Procedure Oversight Committee, The Constitutionality of
House Bill 968 (Nov. 22, 1999), reprinted in BACKGROUND INFORMATION & OPINIONS,
supra note 21, at 14-19.
23. Advisory Opinion: Separation of Powers; House Bill 968; State Personnel Act,
from the N.C. Office of Att'y Gen. to Mr. Ronald G. Penny, State Personnel Director,
Office of State Personnel (July 6, 1999) (signed by Ann Reed, Senior Deputy Attorney
General; Lars Nance, Special Deputy Attorney General; and Thomas F. Moffitt, Special
Deputy Attorney General), reprinted in BACKGROUND INFORMATION & OPINIONS,
supra note 21, at 11-13. In addition, Mr. Moffitt and Mary Penny Thompson opined in an
individual and unofficial article that granting ALIs authority to make final agency
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adopted, which are discussed below, are the result of certain
compromises that increased the status and authority of AJs without
making their decisions binding.
In the new amendments, the General Assembly determined that
OAH personnel are "administrative law judges" who "conduct
administrative hearings"'24 and are not mere "hearing officers" who
"preside in administrative cases."'  The new legislation clarifies that
the A_'s role is to "decide the case" based on the preponderance of
the evidence.26 It also addresses the issue of agency expertise. More
specifically, the new legislation provides explicitly that, in
determining the preponderance of the evidence, the ALJ shall give
"due regard to the demonstrated knowledge and expertise of the
agency with respect to the facts and inferences within the specialized
knowledge of the agency."27 This provision addresses one of the
major problems of administrative law: the role agency expertise
ought to play in administrative decision-making. Over a half century
ago, an analyst posited that agency expertise has been oversold.1
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that in many areas, especially those
involving scientific, technical, or other skills or information, agencies
do, and necessarily must, develop expertise. The question is what to
make of such expertise and, in particular, how it ought to be
employed in adjudication, if at all, especially with respect to
adjudicatory facts.
The General Assembly crafted an approach that represents a
middle ground. The ALJ is not to ignore agency knowledge and
expertise. Rather, the ALJ must give "due regard" to the agency's
"knowledge and expertise" when making findings of fact and
inferences when the facts and inferences fall "within the specialized
decisions was not "reasonably necessary" to carry out purposes of the OAH and could not
be sustained under the constitutional provision authorizing the granting of quasi-judicial
powers to agencies. Thomas F. Moffitt & Mary Penny Thompson, Finality of ALJ
Hearing Decisions, reprinted in BACKGROUND INFORMATION & OPINIONS, supra note
21, at 20-31.
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-750 (Supp. 2000). These are provisions in the organic
legislation instituting the OAH.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-750 (1999), amended by Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190, § 2,
2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546,546-47.
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34(a) (Supp. 2000).
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. Louis B. Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries:
An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARv. L. REv. 436, 471 (1954) (stating that
the success of expertise in areas such as industry and the physical sciences has created the
impression that specialization can also be helpful in politics, philosophy, and the social
sciences).
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knowledge of the agency. '  But it appears that such knowledge and
expertise cannot be presumed. Instead, agency knowledge and
expertise must be "demonstrated."30
Furthermore, the new legislation gives additional status to the
ALJ's decision-making process by permitting an award of attorney's
fees for the ALJ's portion of the administrative proceeding. In cases
in which attorney's fees may otherwise be awarded,31 the new
legislation provides that courts, in their discretion, may make an
award for the "attorney's fees applicable to the administrative review
portion of the case. '32  This provision means that attorney's fees
incurred in the hearing before an administrative law judge may now
be awarded when the criteria for granting any attorney's fees,
otherwise, are met.3 3 As a result of this new legislation, ALJs faced
with cases arising out of the State Personnel System are now
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34(a) (Supp. 2000).
30. Id. The provision does not say, in so many words, who shall make the
demonstration, but the inference that the agency must make the demonstration seems to
be the only reasonable one to make. Not only does the citizen not know what the agency's
knowledge or expertise is, even if the citizen did know, she has no interest in making such
a demonstration. Similarly, the ALT cannot be thought to have any such obligation
because the AUJ is presiding over an adversarial proceeding. Moreover, the limitation to
"demonstrated" knowledge and expertise at least suggests that the matter of agency
expertise and knowledge is not subject to administrative or official notice.
The General Assembly knows how to make a provision for official notice when it
desires to do so. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-30 (1999). Section 30 authorizes the
ALJ to take official notice of facts of which judicial notice may be taken and of "facts
within the specialized knowledge of the agency" under certain specified conditions and
limitations. Id. (emphasis added). The provision does not speak to whether the agency
has expertise or not, but rather to facts within the agency's expertise.
The language of the new provision, which amends section 34(a) of the original
APA, seems to mandate that the agency prove its knowledge and expertise in a particular
case. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34(a) (Supp. 2000). The recent amendments also might
support a claim that the agency demonstrate its knowledge and expertise by a
preponderance of the evidence. As noted, section 34(a) directs the ALJ to decide the case
based on a preponderance of the evidence. Id
31. These new provisions regarding attorney's fees apply only to hearings conducted
under article 3 of the APA and do not apply to "certificate of need" cases. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 6-19.1 (Supp. 2000).
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Id This provision sets forth the following:
[T]he court may, in its discretion, allow the prevailing party to recover
reasonable attorney's fees, including attorney's fees applicable to the
administrative review portion of the case, in contested cases arising under Article
3 of Chapter 150B, to be taxed as court costs against the appropriate agency if:
(1) The court finds that the agency acted without substantial justification in
pressing its claim against the party; and
(2) The court finds that there are no special circumstances that would make
the award of attorney's fees unjust.
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empowered, under certain circumstances, to award to the petitioner
attorney's fees and witness fees against the state agency involved34
Finally, the legislation adds stature to the institutional position of
administrative law judges by making them subject to the "Model
Code of Judicial Conduct for State Administrative Law Judges, as
adopted by the National Conference of Administrative Law Judges,
Judicial Division, American Bar Association. '35  This provision
recognizes that ALJs have a status of professionalism and standing
within the legal community. It is one more signal that the institution
of the ALJ is "coming of age" in the administrative law community,
and indeed within the legal community at large.
These new provisions, especially when considered together with
the revised decision-making authority (discussed in the next section),
evince an unmistakable legislative purpose to heighten the stature of
administrative law judges in this state's system of administrative
adjudication. Moreover, this new legislation augments the authority
of administrative law judges who now must be seen as a more integral
part of the administrative decision-making process and apparatus.36
III. INCREASING THE EFFECT OF ALJs' DECISIONS ON AGENCIES:
REVISED POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES AND
AGENCIES
Under the original APA enacted in 197537 and the provisions of
the 1985 revised APA, 8 the ALl made a recommended decision to
the agency, that in large measure the agency was free to accept or
reject.3 9 In 1987, the General Assembly added a requirement that
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-33(b)(11) (Supp. 2000). This legislation provides that:
An administrative law judge may: ...
(11) Order the assessment of reasonable attorneys' fees and witnesses' fees
against the State agency involved in contested cases decided under Chapter
126 where the administrative law judge finds discrimination, harassment, or
orders reinstatement or back pay.
hd
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-754 (Supp. 2000).
36. Not all decision-making is subject to process involving AI~s. The new process is
applicable to agency action under article 3 of the APA. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150B-22 to
-37 (1999 & Supp. 2000). Special occupational licensing agencies and other selected
agencies are subject to article 3A of the APA, to which the new provisions do not apply.
Id. §§ 150B-38 to -42 (1999).
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-1 to -64 (Supp. 1974), replaced by Act of July 12, 1985,
ch. 746, § 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 987, 987-1011 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 150B-1 to -52 (1999 & Supp. 2000)).
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150B-1 to -52 (1999), amended by Act of July 12, 2000, ch.
190, sees. 4-12, 2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546, 547-52.
39. In a few instances, the ALl's decision was binding. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-
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"the agency shall state in its decision or order the specific reasons why
it did not adopt the administrative law judge's recommended
decision."4 In mandating that agencies state reasons for not adopting
the AU's recommended decision, the legislature was instructing
agencies that their reasons could be reviewed. More importantly, it
was asking courts to oversee the extent to which agencies, in their
decision-making, were giving appropriate attention to the decisions
recommended by administrative law judges. But the requirement did
not seem to have much, if any, effect on agencies' rejection rate of
A.Us' recommendations. 4
Several reasons potentially explain this lack of effect. One
reason might have been that the legislature did not specify the scope
of review that the court should employ in reviewing whether the
agency adequately set forth the reasons for rejecting the AJ's
recommendation. Another reason might have been that the
legislature did not specify to what extent, if at all, the court was to
make a substantive evaluation of the reasons offered.
Notwithstanding these possibilities, the ultimate explanation for a
lack of efficacy in the requirement that an agency state reasons for
rejecting the AL's recommendation was that the courts did not
engage in a "rigorous" review of these reasons.42  This was
36 (1999), amended by Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190, § 7, 2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546,
548-49.
Other states also have provisions for the AUJ's decision to be binding in certain
contexts. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 12-2-2 (1996 & Supp. 2000) (stating that ALJs issue
final decisions in certain matters before the Department of Natural Resources,
Environmental Protection Division); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:992 (2) (West Supp. 2000)
(designating certain adjudications in which "the administrative law judge shall issue the
final decision or order, whether or not on rehearing, and the agency shall have no
authority to override such decision or order"); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. I § 10-
708(k)(9) (1998) ("[T]he determination of the administrative law judge is a final decision
for the purpose of judicial review of a final decision under the Administrative Procedure
Act."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 43A.33, subd. 4 (West 1988) (stating that an ALJ's order shall
be the "final decision" in certain grievances involving state employees, but ALJs make
recommended decisions to agencies generally in contested cases under the Minnesota
administrative procedure provisions, as set forth in MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.50 (West
1997)).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36(b) (1999), amended by Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190,
§ 7,2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546,548-49.
41. See infra Part V.D., APA study chart 11 (explaining that agencies rejected AIJs'
recommended decisions in 88% of the cases in which petitioners prevailed before the
ALJs).
42. See, e.g., Justice v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 121 N.C. App. 314, 319, 465 S.E.2d 554,
557 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (finding that the agency stated a specific reason in declining
to adopt the AI's conclusions, namely that the ALJ's conclusions of law were inaccurate
and not supported by substantial evidence in the record), rev'd per curiam, 343 N.C. 504,
505, 471 S.E.2d 414, 415 (1996) (reversing on grounds stated in Judge Johnson's dissent);
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attributable, at least in part, to the lack of legislative directions.
Indeed, in one decision the court refused to review, despite the
petitioner's request, whether the agency's stated reasons for not
adopting the ALI's decision were correct.43 Still another decision
applied what appeared to be the limited "substantial evidence" test to
examine the agency's asserted reason for not adopting the ALJ's
decision.44 The conclusion is unavoidable that judicial review of the
agencies' "respect" for the ALJs' recommended decisions did not
prove effective or satisfactory.
A. ALJ and Agency Powers Regarding Findings of Fact
In order to remedy this deficiency, one provision of Session
Law 2000-190 amends section 36 of the APA.4 5 This provision has
four aspects: (1) the agency shall adopt the ALl's findings of facts,
(2) unless the ALI's finding is clearly contrary, (3) to the
preponderance of the admissible evidence, (4) after giving due regard
to the opportunity of the AL to evaluate the credibility of
witnesses 6 The provision plainly sets the default condition to be the
adoption of the ALl's findings of fact. The agency is now required to
demonstrate not merely that the ALl's decision is one with which the
Davis v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 110 N.C. App. 730, 737, 432 S.E.2d 132, 136 (1993)
(upholding the agency's statement of reasons for rejecting the AIJ's recommended
decision because the agency "was merely exercising its prerogative to weigh the evidence
and to determine the credibility of the witnesses[,I ... when it added an additional
conclusion of law, finding [a witness's] rendition of the facts to be more consistent with the
other evidence"); Ford v. N.C. Dep't of Env't, Health, & Natural Res., 107 N.C. App. 192,
199, 419 S.E.2d 204, 208 (1992) (upholding the agency's statement of reasons stating that
the agency "simply viewed the record of evidence differently from the ALT, rejected many
of the ALI's findings of fact, substituted its own, and on those grounds drew different
conclusions of law-all leading to its rejection of the AJ's recommended decision");
Webb v. N.C. Dep't of Env't, Health, & Natural Res., 102 N.C. App. 767, 770, 404 S.E.2d
29, 31 (1991) (noting that a provision requiring a statement of reasons for not adopting
"does not require a point-by-point refutation of the Administrative Law Judge's findings
and conclusions and the reasons stated ... are quite specific indeed and go to the heart of
the case").
43. Oates v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 114 N.C. App. 597, 600, 442 S.E.2d 542, 544 (1994)
(rejecting the petitioner's argument that on judicial review he was entitled to have the
court determine whether the agency's stated reasons for not adopting the ALJ's
recommended decision were correct).
44. Ritter v. Dep't of Human Res., 118 N.C. App. 564,568,455 S.E.2d 901,903 (1995)
(upholding the agency's "decision to adopt its own findings of fact and to reject many of
the ALU's recommended findings of fact [as being] supported by the whole record").
45. "The agency shall adopt each finding of fact contained in the administrative law
judge's decision unless the finding is clearly contrary to the preponderance of the
admissible evidence, giving due regard to the opportunity of the administrative law judge
to evaluate the credibility of witnesses." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36(b) (Supp. 2000).
46. Id.
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agency disagrees, but that the decision is clearly contrary, not just
contrary, to the preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, in
assessing whether the factual finding is clearly contrary to the
evidence, the agency is instructed to give due regard to the fact that
the ALJ saw and heard the witnesses. The legislation plainly implies
that the ALJ is in the best position to evaluate credibility. One
cannot know how the courts ultimately will interpret these provisions.
It seems clear, at least to this writer, that the General Assembly was
attempting to give the ALJs' decisions considerably more weight with
agencies than they had been accorded under prior law.
A second provision of the 2001 amendments adds more rigorous
requirements to the APA when an agency wishes to reject findings of
fact made by the ALJ.4 7 This provision requires that if an agency
plans to reject a finding of fact, the agency must: (1) for each finding
it rejects set forth, (2) separately and in detail, (3) the reasons for not
adopting the finding, and (4) the evidence in the record that it relied
upon in not adopting a finding of fact.48 This provision also mandates
that any fact not rejected as required shall be deemed accepted for
purposes of judicial review.
49
A third amendment addresses instances in which the agency
makes a finding of fact that was not made by the AL. 50 The import
of this provision is that agencies cannot make different or alternative
findings without the same rigors required for rejecting the AJl's
47. The new section provides:
For each finding of fact not adopted by the agency, the agency shall set forth
separately and in detail the following:
(1) The reasons for not adopting the findings of fact.
(2) The evidence in the record relied upon by the agency in not adopting the
finding of fact contained in the administrative law judge's decision.
Any finding of fact not specifically rejected as required by this subsection
shall be deemed accepted for purposes of judicial review of the final decision
pursuant to Article 4 of this Chapter.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36(bl) (Supp. 2000).
48. Id
49. Id
50. The new section provides:
For each finding of fact made by the agency that is not contained in the
administrative law judge's decision, the agency shall set forth separately and in
detail the evidence in the record relied upon by the agency in making the finding
of fact. Any new finding of fact made by the agency shall be supported by a
preponderance of the admissible evidence in the record. The agency shall not
make any new finding of fact that is inconsistent with a finding of fact contained
in the administrative law judge's decision unless the finding of fact in the
administrative law judge's decision is not adopted as required by subsection (bl)
of this section.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36(b2) (Supp. 2000).
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findings of fact. Similar to the case of rejecting findings, the agency
must: (1) for each finding it makes set forth, (2) separately and in
detail, (3) the evidence in the record that it relied upon in making a
new finding of fact not made by the AUJ. In addition, (4) the
agency's findings must be supported by a preponderance of evidence
in the record and, (5) cannot be inconsistent with any finding of fact
in the ALJ's decision, (6) except when the agency has rejected that
finding of fact under the required procedure. 1
B. ALJ and Agency Powers Regarding Final Agency Decisions
The amendments discussed above affect an agency's ability to
make new findings of fact, as well as to reject the ALI's findings of
fact. Although it is not framed in exactly these terms, the fourth
amendment to the APA addresses an agency's conclusions of law
and, apparently, the agency's ultimate decision on a case's merits.
Having addressed findings of fact, the only matters left to be
addressed would be an agency's conclusions of law and its final
decision in the contested case. As with findings of fact, the new
legislation plainly sets the default condition as the adoption of the
ALJ's conclusions of law and ultimate decision on the merits.
With exceptions noted and not pertinent to this discussion
regarding conclusions and the decision on the merits, 2 the fourth
amendment requires that: (1) an agency shall adopt the decision of
the ALJ unless (2) the agency demonstrates that the decision of the
ALJ is (3) clearly contrary (4) to the preponderance of the admissible
evidence in the record. 3 The provision then requires that: (5) the
agency shall set forth its reasoning for the final decision (a) in light of
the findings of fact and (b) conclusions of law in the final decision, (c)
including any exercise of discretion by the agency.
54
51. AL
52. The exception applies to "certificate of need" cases for health care facilities and
services under sections 131E-175 to -190 (1999 & Supp. 2000).
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36(b3) (Supp. 2000).
54. Id. The text of the new amendment provides:
[T]he agency shall adopt the decision of the administrative law judge unless the
agency demonstrates that the decision of the administrative law judge is clearly
contrary to the preponderance of the admissible evidence in the record. If the
agency does not adopt the administrative law judge's decision as its final
decision, the agency shall set forth its reasoning for the final decision in light of
the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the final decision, including any
exercise of discretion by the agency. The agency may consider only the official
record prepared [by the ALJ in the case] in making a final decision.
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It should be noted that there is no provision for judicial review of
the agency's compliance with the particular provisions regarding the
agency's findings, conclusions, or decision. Section 36(b3) clearly
requires the agency to set forth its reasoning for not adopting the
AL's decision.5 But whether the agency complied with the required
procedural steps and whether its reasoning is adequate are questions
that are not subject to judicial review, independently of the review of
the decision on its merits. Section 51(c) provides that when the
agency does not adopt the AI's decision, upon conducting judicial
review, "the court shall not give deference to any prior decision made
in the case. '56 Thus, on judicial review, the court will make a decision
de novo on the merits of the case. The court will not determine
whether the agency properly refused to adopt the AI's decision
except as part of its review of the decision on its merits. As a
practical matter, in its ultimate determination on review of the
decision, it Would not be unreasonable to expect that the court would
be influenced by whether the agency scrupulously complied with the
procedural requirements and by the strength and persuasiveness of
the reasons the agency sets forth for refusing to adopt the ALI's
decision. 7
These provisions represent a compromise between opposing
points of view on the potential effects of ALT decisions. Proponents
of one view-largely representative of agencies and supporters of
agency expertise or executive prerogatives-believed that the ALI's
decision was merely a recommendation to the agency and that the
agency, as under prior law, could reject an AL's recommended
decision with little constraint. 8 Proponents of the contrary view were
largely representative of affected citizens and regulated entities, along
with members of the administrative law bar whose practices included
representation of regulated interests. Their view was that the A]Ls
should be empowered to make final decisions that would be binding
on agencies.5 9 However, the General Assembly chose neither
55. Id.
56. Id. § 150B-51(c) (Supp. 2000).
57. See Miller, supra note 21, at 1665; see also infra Part IV (discussing judicial
review).
58. Prior law required agencies merely to set forth the reasons for rejecting the ALI's
decision. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36(b) (1999), amended by Act of July 12,2000, ch. 190,
§ 7,2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546,548-49.
59. In some instances in North Carolina, ALs do make final decisions. See, e.g., N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 150B-36(c) (1999 & Supp. 2000); id. § 7A-759(e) (1999) (providing that in an
employment discrimination decision, as a deferral agency for the Federal Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, an order entered by an administrative law judge
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alternative. Instead, it crafted a middle ground that: (1) restricts the
power of agencies to decline to adopt ALJs' decisions, and (2) ties the
scope and standard of judicial review to whether the agency adopted
or refused to adopt the AL's decision. It went on to provide that the
"traditional" scope of review will continue to apply to cases in which
an agency adopts the AL's decision. But when an agency has not
adopted an AL's decision, the reviewing court will give the agency's
decision de novo review.
At this point it should be noted that, even under the traditional
standard of review, courts purported to accord de novo review to ,
"law-based" decisions and a more limited "substantial evidence"
review to "fact-based" decisions. Accordingly, an empirical analysis
of court decisions on judicial review of "law-based" and "fact-based"
decisions may help determine how courts are deciding cases in
practice.6°  Notice further that the new judicial review regime
distinguishes cases based upon whether the agency adopts or does not
adopt the decision of the ALJ. As reported in Part V 6f this Article,
an empirical study of decided cases does not support the view that the
agency's adoption or rejection of the ALI's decision materially affects
the outcome of the case upon judicial review.6 1  It might be
interesting, and possibly instructive, to assess empirically judicial
review behavior regarding de novo review of "law-based" decisions,.5'4
under the traditional scope of review.62 But whether examining the-
traditional de novo review of "law-based" decisions will predict how- -
the new de novo review will affect cases in which agencies do not
adopt ALJ decisions remains to be seen.
after a contested case hearing on the merits of a deferred charge is a final agency decision ',
that is binding on the parties). Some states have limited instances in which ALJs make,,
final and binding decisions on agencies and parties. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 8025.1(b) (1995) (providing that a decision by an ALT on the status of a suspension of a
shorthand reporter is a final determination); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:992 (B)(2) (West
Supp. 2000) (providing that the ALT makes the final decision in adjudications commenced
by the Division of Administrative Law); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN I § 10-708(k)(9)
(1994) (providing that an ALI's determination is a final decision when a decision made by"
a hospital to administer medicine involuntarily is appealed).
Research has revealed no instance of a state with a system exactly like the system
adopted in North Carolina in Session Law 2000, ch. 190.
60. See infra Part V.C.
61. Id
62. See infra Part V.C.2.
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IV. RESTRUCTURING JUDICIAL REVIEW TO GIVE COURTS MORE
EXTENSIVE REVIEW WHEN AGENCIES REJECT ALJs' DECISIONS
A. The Premises of Judicial Review
Judicial review is based on the fundamental premise that courts
are the final arbiters of governmental determinations affecting the
legal rights, duties, or privileges of specifically named persons.63 The
judicial review provisions of administrative procedure acts determine
the relationships that exist between agencies and courts, specify the
respective roles of courts and agencies in the execution of
governmental business, circumscribe the persons who may invoke
court process as a check on agencies' actions, and set out the
procedures applicable for invoking court process.' 4 The issue of
proper allocation of functions and roles is difficult. Nevertheless, for
purposes of analysis, one can conceptually separate the basic
problems into three general areas: (1) the availability of judicial
process to control agency action, (2) the ways judicial control may be
sought, and (3) the nature of judicial control-the manner in which it
is exercised, as well as the limitations upon it. The remainder of this
discussion is organized on this conceptual framework.
63. This generalization is a substantial oversimplification of this very difficult topic
and is subject to many exceptions. See generally Louis JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 87-120 (1965) (describing the constitutional basis for agencies'
exercise of judicial power, courts' exercise of administrative power, and agencies' exercise
of enforcement power). The general conclusion stated derives from limitations expressed
in Article III of the United States Constitution and in state constitutions. E.g., N.C.
CONST. art. IV, § 1, (establishing that the judicial power is vested in courts). However, the
North Carolina Constitution also specifically contemplates that administrative agencies, in
certain instances, may be vested with judicial powers without thus constituting them as
parts of the judiciary. State ex reL Util. Comm'n v. Old Fort Finishing Plant, 264 N.C. 416,
422,142 S.E.2d 8, 12 (1964).
N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 3, provides:
Judicial powers of administrative agencies. The General Assembly may vest
in administrative agencies established pursuant to law such judicial powers as
may be reasonably necessary as an incident to the accomplishment of the
purposes for which the agencies were created. Appeals from administrative
agencies shall be to the General Court of Justice.
The rights in question may arise out of "open courts" provisions of state
constitutions. See, e.g., Sears v. Romer, 928 P.2d 745, 750 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) ("Judicial
review need not be a de novo review, and an appellate court may give deference to the
findings of an administrative agency and still be in compliance with the constitutional open
access guarantees.").
64. The judicial review provisions in the APA are in sections 150B-43 to -52 of the
North Carolina General Statutes (1999 & Supp. 2000).
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Judicial review standards, as set forth in administrative
procedure acts and as applied by courts, determine the extent to
which courts control agency conduct. Concomitantly, these standards
determine how citizens can challenge agency conduct without
resorting to the political process to try to change agency behavior. As
such, these three matters require a delicate balance and sensitive
examination. The balance must be effected so that agencies are not
unduly constrained in carrying on the business of government for
which they have special duties and possibly special experience. At
the same time, citizens must have a reasonable means to challenge
agency conduct in court so that there can be meaningful and effective
control of agencies, and ultimately the government, in order to
protect basic rights. Of all the problems in administrative law,
perhaps none is more difficult to resolve satisfactorily than
determining the standards by which judicial control of administrative
action is to be exercised. An exact balance is not easy to achieve.
Somewhat remarkably, the General Assembly crafted a dual
system of judicial review to be implemented beginning with contested
cases initiated on or after January 1, 2001. Under the new
requirements, the traditional approach to judicial review is limited to
instances in which the agency adopts the decision of the ALJ. Under
the traditional approach, the agency's decision is given a limited
scope of review. This limited scope of review is discussed next,
followed by a discussion of the new method of de novo review of an
agency decision that does not adopt the ALI's decision.
B. Traditional Judicial Review: When the Agency Adopts the ALl's
Decision
When the agency adopts the ALJ's decision, the scope of the
review will be the traditional one: limited substantial evidence review
of facts and de novo review of questions of law. With respect to
agency decisions that adopt the AL's decision, the current version of
the APA specifies five dispositions a court may take on judicial
review of an agency's decision. The court may affirm, remand for
further proceedings, "reverse or modify the agency's decision, or
adopt the administrative law judge's decision. "65 The court's power to
affirm or remand is not specifically circumscribed.66 The court's
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b) (Supp. 2000) (emphasis added). The phrase "or
adopt the administrative law judge's decision" was added in the amendments that became
effective January 1, 2001. Act of July 12, 2000, ch 190, § 11, 2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv.
546,551-52.
66. In re Appeal of N.C. Say. & Loan League, 302 N.C. 458, 465-71, 276 S.E.2d 404,
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power to reverse or modify an agency's decision, or adopt the AL's
decision is limited. To reverse or modify an agency's decision, or
adopt the ALJ's decision the court must find:
(a) that the petitioner's substantial rights,
(b) "may have been prejudiced,"
(c) by agency "findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions"
that are:
(1) [i]n violation of constitutional provisions;
(2) [i]n excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of
the agency;
(3) [m]ade upon unlawful procedure;
(4) [a]ffected by other error of law;
(5) [u]nsupported by substantial evidence admissible
[under specified sections of the Act] in view of the entire record
submitted; or
(6) [a]rbitrary, capricious. 67 or an abuse of discretion.'
Note that the quoted provision provides that the court may
reverse or modify the agency's decision, or adopt the ALl's decision
in limited circumstances. An agency can adopt the AU's decision in
one of two basic situations:69 the AIL ruled in favor of the agency0 or
the ALJ ruled against the agency and in favor of the petitioner.71 The
party seeking judicial review and seeking to have the ALl's decision
adopted by the court only will do so when the ALl's decision was
favorable to the petitioner, but the agency with decision-making
410-13 (1981) (reviewing an agency's interpretation of the statutory term "common bond"
for purposes of participation in the credit union).
67. The foregoing six grounds were contained in both the original and the revised
APAs. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-51 (Supp. 1974), replaced by Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 746,
sec. 1, § 150A-51, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 987, 1007; id. § 15OB-51(b) (1999), amended by Act
of July 12, 2000, ch. 190, § 11, 2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546,551-52.
68. N.C. GEN STAT. § 150B-51(b) (Supp. 2000) (emphasis added). "Abuse of
discretion" was added by the amendments that became effective January 1, 2001. Act of
July 12,2000, ch. 190, § 11, 2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546,551-52.
69. There is at least theoretically a third possible situation-the AL ruled in part in
favor of the agency and in part in favor of petitioner and the agency adopted the ALl's
decision. This situation is not considered here.
70. See, e.g., Powell v. N. C. Dep't of Transp., 347 N.C. 614, 617-21, 499 S.E.2d 180,
181-84 (1998) (upholding the State Personnel Commission's adoption of the ALJ's
decision that the employee's position was "policymaking exempt" from the protections of
the State Personnel Act).
71. See, e.g., N. C. Dep't of Transp. v. Hodge, 347 N.C. 602, 607, 499 S.E.2d 187, 190
(1998) (rejecting the department's appeal of the State Personnel Commission's order
adopting the AIJ's decision that the petitioner's position was not "policymaking exempt"
from the protections of the State Personnel Act).
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authority did not adopt the AIU's decision.72 Conversely, in the
ordinary case, when the agency adopts the ALJ's decision and that
decision is favorable to the petitioner, there either cannot be a
petition for judicial review or, as a practical matter, no party will seek
judicial review. In cases in which there is only one agency and it has
adopted the ALl's decision as its final decision, there cannot be an
appeal because, it goes without saying, an agency cannot appeal its
own decision. Also, when the petitioner has prevailed because the
agency adopted a decision of the ALJ favorable to the petitioner, the
petitioner who prevailed will not appeal.
But other situations could arise in which the "decision-making"
agency has adopted the ALl's decision, yet a party remains who
would still pursue judicial review. In some cases one agency (the
decision-making agency) may be making a decision involving another
agency (the second agency). Two illustrations can demonstrate how
this situation could happen. The first illustration would be a case in
which, for example, an individual was affected in his employment by a
state department (the second agency). The individual could then
seek a contested case hearing. The individual would be the petitioner
and the ALJ would conduct the hearing and make a "decision." The
ALl's decision could be that the agency's action regarding the
petitioner's employment was unlawful and should be reversed. The
ALJ's decision would then go to the State Personnel Commission
("SPC") (the decision-making agency) for a "final decision." The
SPC could then adopt the decision of the AL and that decision of the
SPC would be binding on the department that adversely affected the
petitioner's employment. 73 The department would then seek judicial
review of the SPC's decision.74
The second illustration of a case in which the decision-making
agency adopts the ALJ's decision but there is still a party who
appeals, concerns occupational and health violation matters in which
more than one state agency is involved and the decision-making
agency adopts the ALl's decision. For example, the Commissioner of
Labor or other designated employee of the Department of Labor may
issue citations for violation of work safety rules (the second agency).
The affected company may seek a contested case hearing as to the
citation before an ALl. After a hearing, the ALJ makes a decision
72. This situation is discussed in the next topic. See infra Part IV.C.
73. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-37 (1999).
74. See, e.g., Hodge, 347 N.C. at 607, 499 S.E.2d at 190 (rejecting the department's
appeal of the SPC's order adopting the ALT's decision that the petitioner's position was
not "policymaking exempt" from the protections of the State Personnel Act).
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that then goes to the Safety Health and Review Board (the decision-
making agency). If that Board adopts the ALJ's decision that no
violation occurred, the Commissioner of Labor may seek judicial
review.' But in neither case would the second agency seek to have
the reviewing court adopt the ALJ's decision, rather it would seek to
reverse or modify both the ALJ's decision and the decision-making
agency's decision.
The discussion in this section will be limited to the more common
situations in which the petitioner requests the court to reverse or
modify the decision-making agency's decision when the decision-
making agency has adopted the ALJ's decision.76 The judicial review
provision requires that in order to reverse or modify, the court must
find that "substantial rights" may have been "prejudiced." 7  This
standard indicates that court intervention into the agency process is
not a matter to be taken lightly. Insubstantial and purely technical or
formal rights clearly are subject to a "harmless error" construction.
However, a petitioner does not have to demonstrate that substantial
rights were prejudiced, but that the action complained of raises such a
significant risk of prejudice to the petitioner that judicial review of
the agency's decision is warranted.
7 8
When examining the substantive standards for reversal or
modification, it is useful to suggest that four of the standards are
"law-based" inquiries, while two of the standards are "fact-based"
inquiries. 79 The distinction drawn between "law-based" and "fact-
based" inquiries on judicial review is significant. The courts have
developed the view that on judicial review of an "error of law"-the
75. See Brooks v. BCF Piping, Inc., 109 N.C. App. 26, 28-29, 426 S.E.2d 282, 283-84
(1993).
76. Instances in which the petitioner seeks judicial review and urges the court to adopt
the AL's decision will be cases that are subject to the provisions governing review in
which the agency did not adopt the ALJ's decision. That situation will be discussed in the
next topic. See infra Part IV.C.
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b) (Supp. 2000).
78. Contrast the nature of the demonstration necessary under the standard that
agency action "may have prejudiced" substantial rights with one that requires a demon-
stration that agency action "has prejudiced" substantial rights. The distinction seems
plainly to lie in the difference between a risk or probability as opposed to a certainty or
"fact." See 2 FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIvE LAW 663-64 (1965).
79. The following issues are "law-based": agency action in violation of the
constitution, action in excess of the agency's statutory authority or jurisdiction, agency
action made upon unlawful procedure, or agency decision-making that is affected by an
other error of law. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text. The following issues are
"fact-based": agency decision-making that is unsupported by substantial evidence, or
agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. See infra notes 121-22
and accompanying text.
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law-based inquiry-the court's review is de novo.80 When the courts
inquire whether the evidence adequately supports a fact found or an
inference drawn-the fact-based inquiry-the court is authorized to
change the decision only if the decision is not supported by
"substantial evidence" based on a review of the "whole record."81
The cases do not provide a precise, self-executing, or
nonjudgmental way of defining what is an "error of law." The
difficulty inheres in the nature of questions raised in judicial review
proceedings. Such determinations are seldom solely factual, but often
contain elements of both "fact" and "law."'  The supposed "classical
dichotomy" that exists when distinguishing between elements of fact
and elements of law when determining the scope of review "is of little
use as a working tool" 3 and has been characterized as "often not an
illuminating test" that is "never self-executing."'  One would thus not
be surprised that "[w]hat one judge regards as a question of fact
another thinks is a question of law." 85  Perhaps only an ultimate
conclusion can be stated: a "question of law" is a matter that the
court decides should be subject to plenary or de novo consideration,
with the court being free to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency. A "question of fact" is a matter the court concludes should
be subjected to a more restricted review, with the agency's decision
80. E.g., In re Appeal of N.C. Say. & Loan League, 302 N.C. 458, 465, 276 S.E.2d 404
410 (1981) (stating that "[w]hen the issue on appeal is whether a state agency erred in
interpreting a statutory term, an appellate court may freely substitute its judgment for that
of the agency and employ de novo review") (citing State ex reL Comm'r of Ins. v. Rate
Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 450, 269 S.E.2d 547, 589 (1980); Daye, supra note 3, at 915); accord
Hodgkins v. N.C. Real Estate Comm'n, 130 N.C. App. 626, 631, 504 S.E.2d 789, 793
(1998); Amanini v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., N.C. Special Care Ctr., 114 N.C. App. 668,
674,443 S.E.2d 114, 118 (1994).
81. E.g., Hodgkins, 130 N.C. App. at 633-34, 504 S.E.2d at 794-95 (1998);
Employment Sec. Comm'n of N.C. v. Peace, 122 N.C. App. 313, 317-18,470 S.E.2d 63, 67-
68 (1996).
82. The question whether, under a statutory definition, a person is an "employee," a
"farmer," a "broker," a "securities dealer," a "manufacturer," a "seller," or a "pesticide
applicator" depends on both a "fact-based" determination of what the person does (or
did) as well as a "law-based" determination of the legal conclusion that follows upon
determination of what a person does (or did). The general problem is by no means limited
to scope of review issues. The problem of whether the question, "Was the defendant
negligent?" is a question of law or fact has never been settled definitively. This is so
because its resolution involves a determination of both what the defendant did as well as
whether he deviated from a standard of conduct of the "reasonable person."
83. 2 COOPER, supra note 78, at 665.
84. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665,671 (1944).
85. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITrEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL
REPORT 90 (Jan. 24, 1941).
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accorded a higher level of deference than is accorded to questions of
law.8
6
One factor that seems to be influencing decisions about the
factual or legal nature of an administrative determination appears to
be the court's idea of whether the agency is better suited to make a
judgment upon the matter, or whether a court is at least equally well-
suited to evaluate the matter. The distinction between whether a
'question is one of fact or of law thus becomes the cutting edge for a
policy decision on the allocation of functions between agencies and
courts. Accordingly, on issues that the legislature has created
agencies to resolve, and when it has provided them with resources to
acquire a special competence to evaluate such issues, the court
generally should accord these agencies a greater degree of room to
apply such special competenceY This judicial deference is most
appropriately accorded if, in the particular case, it appears that special
agency competence was actually involved in the determination, and
was, in fact, applied in rendering the decision.88
Also, other external factors appear to have a direct bearing on
the courts' willingness to permit the agency a wider latitude in
decision-making under this standard. These factors, which amount to
practical solutions, include the lack of prejudice of the decision-
86. See 2 COOPER, supra note 78, at 666.
87. See, e.g., Wickman v. Ariz. State Bd. of Osteopathic Exam'rs (In re Wickman), 674
P.2d 891, 895 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) ("[O]n judicial review of the decision of an
administrative agency and when viewing the sufficiency of the evidence, courts should
show a certain degree of deference to the judgment of the agency based upon the
accumulated experience and expertise of its members."); Cal. Hotel & Motel Ass'n v.
Indus. Welfare Comm'n, 599 P.2d 31, 38 (Cal. 1979) (in bank) (by the court) (stating that
judicial review of quasi-legislative administrative decisions are limited out of deference to
the "presumed expertise of the agency within its scope of authority"); Yater v. Hancock
County Bd. of Health, 677 N.E.2d 526, 529 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that when
"conducting judicial review of the decision of an administrative body [a court] may not
substitute its own opinions and conclusions for those of the board but must give deference
to the expertise of the board"); Hayes v. Yount, 552 P.2d 1038, 1044 (Wash. 1976) (en
.banc) (noting that on judicial review "'due deference must be given to the specialized
knowledge and expertise of the administrative agency' ") (quoting Dep't of Ecology v.
Ballard Elk Lodge 827,527 P.2d 1121,1124 (Wash. 1974)).
88. Kort v. Carlson, 723 P.2d 143, 149 (Colo. 1986) (en banc) (determining that one
function of judicial review is ensuring that special expertise was actually brought into
play). According to the Oregon Supreme Court, courts "should give deference to the
administrative interpretation" on judicial review even to questions that "analytically may
be designated questions of law." Rogers Constr. Co. v. Hill, 384 P.2d 219, 222 (Or. 1963).
This is true when "the experience of administrative personnel in the particular field is of
,material assistance in arriving at a decision." Id. "The degree of deference will vary
,depending upon the apparent degree of reasonableness of the administrative decision and
.-,the degree to which the problem involves knowledge peculiar to an industry, business,
etc." Id.
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maker, the experience of the agency, the procedure through which
the decision was derived, the thoroughness of the agency's
consideration, the relationship of the agency to the parties who might
be affected, and other largely intangible factors that cause the
reviewing court, in a particular case, to have confidence in the
agency's determination. 9
Perhaps this practical resolution of the problem is satisfactory so
long as it is remembered that what is really at stake is the proper
relationship between agencies and courts in the overall scheme of
carrying out the government's, and ultimately, the citizens', business.
1. Judicial Review of Issues that Tend to be "Law-Based"
Under the revised APA, four judicial review issues are questions
of law: (1) a violation of the constitution, (2) an action in excess of
the agency's statutory authority or jurisdiction, (3) the agency's action
was "[m]ade upon unlawful procedure," or (4) the decision was
"[a]ffected by other error of law."9 Although the revisions effective
January 1, 2001 amended section 51, these grounds of review were
not revised from those that appeared both in the original APA91 and
the revised APA.9  There is a substantial body of interpretation
confirming that courts review any of these four issues de novo.93 Part
V will set forth the results of the empirical study that assesses whether
there is a difference in the courts' likely disposition of cases under the
de novo standard of review as compared to cases in which review is
based on the "substantial evidence" test.
94
a. Violation of the Constitution
If a petitioner on judicial review alleges that agency action is "in
violation of constitutional provisions," the petitioner could be
complaining of, at least, one of three different things. First, if the
89. E.g., Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., St. Francis Div. of Children & Family Servs. v.
Thompson, 959 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Ark. 1998) (noting that "'administrative agencies are
better equipped than courts, by specialization, insight through experience, and more
flexible procedures to determine and analyze underlying legal issues affecting their
agencies' ") (quoting Wright v. Ark. State Plant Bd., 842 S.W.2d 42,45 (1992)).
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b) (1999 & Supp. 2000).
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-43 to -64 (Supp. 1974), replaced by Act of July 12, 1985
ch. 746, § 1, 1985 Sess. Laws 987, 987-1011 (effective January 1, 1986) (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150B-43 to -52 (1999 & Supp. 2000)).
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150B-43 to -52 (1999), amended by Act of July 12, 2000, ch.
190, §§ 9-12,2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546,550-52.
93. Each specific issue, including the scope of review of that issue, will be discussed in
the next four subsections. See infra Part IV.B.1(a)-(d).
94. See infra Part V.C.
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complaint concerns action the agency is specifically authorized to
take under a statute, the real challenge is to the statute insofar as it
authorizes the action. For example, this situation would exist when
the petitioner claims the statute authorizes a taking without due
process of law or without just compensation or that the statute makes
an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
Second, a complaint may concern action the agency has taken
under a statute, pursuant to the agency's interpretation of the statute.
When the petitioner alleges that the action is unconstitutional, the
petitioner is not challenging the statute itself, but rather the agency's
interpretation of the statute or the statute as applied by the agency.
For example, this situation would be presented if the agency decided
that a statute authorized the agency to regulate a certain species of
activity that infringed the petitioner's free speech rights or to issue an
order prohibiting the petitioner from engaging in certain lawful
conduct.
Third, if the agency has, for example, imposed a penalty or
revoked a permit under a general grant of power, and the complaint
is that the agency has undertaken the action in an unconstitutional
way or has unconstitutionally affected an interest of the petitioner,
the challenge is not to the statute, but to the agency action. For
instance, this situation would arise if the agency decided that it did
not need to give advance notice to the petitioner before deciding to
terminate a permit, or that the agency did not need to provide a
hearing in advance of imposing a penalty against the petitioner.
Although each of the above instances would involve a different
degree of judicial control, oversight, or intrusion into the agency
process, each seems to fall within the standard authorizing a court to
reverse or modify a decision on the ground that the decision of the
agency violates constitutional rights. Issues that have been raised
include deprivation of property without due process of law,95 violation
of equal protection,96 or violation of specific provisions of a particular
95. See generally 2 COOPER, supra note 78, at 683-84 (listing condemnation of
property without a fair hearing, deprivation of property by prohibiting a lawful use of it, or
retroactive application of decisions). Other issues that might arise on these grounds likely
include an unconstitutional taking without compensation and inadequate notice. These
issues could arise because of an express statutory provision authorizing the agency action
or because the agency interprets the statute to permit the action.
96. Meads v. N.C. Dep't of Agric., Food and Drug Prot. Div., Pesticide Section, 349
N.C. 656, 676, 509 S.E.2d 165, 178 (1998) (holding that the agency did not violate equal
protection in treating aerial and ground applicators of pesticides differently when the
differences were not arbitrary and were reasonable because they rested upon the
"differences in licensing requirements and qualifications associated with each method").
1596 [Vol. 79
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state constitution, such as unlawful delegation of judicial power97 or
legislative power 98 to an agency.
In cases of such constitutional challenge, the court generally
possesses a plenary power to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency, at least to the extent that factual determinations are not
involved. 99 When factual determinations are involved as a predicate
to the resolution of the constitutional issue, a question of the fact/law
distinction may be implicated.1°
b. In Excess of Statutory Authority or Jurisdiction
The second situation for judicial reversal or modification that is
governed by de novo review concerns decisions that are "in excess of
statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency." 10 1 This statutory
formulation has been viewed as a "codification of long established
common law principles."'" Actions challenged as ultra vires, as
beyond geographic 03 or subject matter jurisdiction, 1°4 as imposing
97. N.C. Private Protective Serv. Bd. v. Gray, Inc., 87 N.C. App. 143, 146-47, 360
S.E.2d 135, 137-38 (1987) (holding that empowering the agency "'to assess a civil penalty
of up to $2,000.00 in lieu of revocation or suspension of a license is not an unconstitutional
attempt to [bestow] a judicial power on a state agency" because the power was
"reasonably necessary" to the purposes for which the agency was created and contained
appropriate guidelines for the exercise of the discretion).
98. Bring v. N.C. State Bar, 126 N.C. App. 655,658,486 S.E.2d 236,238 (1997) (" 'The
constitutional power to establish the qualifications for admission to the Bar of this State
rests in the Legislature,' "but the Legislature could properly " 'delegate a limited portion
of its power as to some specific subject matter [because] it prescrib[ed] the standards
under which the agency was to exercise the delegated authority.' ") (quoting In re Williss,
288 N.C. 1, 14-15,215 S.E.2d 771,779 (1975)).
99. See generally 2 COOPER, supra note 78, at 680-89 (discussing the various grounds
upon which a court may substitute its judgment for that of the agency).
100. This problem is briefly discussed infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
101. N.C. GEN STAT. § 150B-51(b) (1999 & Supp. 2000).
102. 2 COOPER, supra note 78, at 690. Often when a petitioner complains that the
agency is acting in excess of authority or jurisdiction it will be alleged that such agency
action violates the petitioner's constitutional rights. 2 id. at 687. In substance, such an
allegation is no more than an assertion that one has a constitutional right that agencies act
within their statutory powers or their statutorily prescribed jurisdiction before they can
constitutionally affect one's interest. This claim, while perhaps arguably sound, risks
confusing the real issue, which is one of statutory construction, and not constitutional
interpretation. Moreover, it adds nothing to the petitioner's claim because agency action
in excess of authority or jurisdiction will be set aside on judicial review regardless of
whether the petitioner also alleges a constitutional violation. 2 it.
103. For example, an agency with statewide jurisdiction over corporations operating in
North Carolina attempts to regulate a corporation not operating in the state, or an agency
of the state with geographic jurisdiction limited to specified counties attempts to act
outside those counties.
104. For example, an agency empowered to regulate manufacturers of pesticides
attempts to regulate an entity that does not manufacture pesticides.
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requirements not authorized by statute,105 as refusing to impose
requirements statutorily required, °6 or as not falling within time
limitations prescribed by statute, have been set aside by courts as
being in excess of authority or in excess of jurisdiction.10 7
The extent to which the court should substitute its judgment for
the agency's when a statutory authority or jurisdiction issue is raised
may present a problem. As a general rule, courts are regarded as
possessing power freely to substitute their judgment for that of an
agency when the question is one of statutory interpretation. ° This
power is always involved in resolving authority and jurisdiction issues.
But courts, particularly federal courts, historically have accorded
"weight," "deference," or "respect" to many agency determinations
that interpret statutes.109
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court announced the
Chevron110 rule, which has restricted the role of federal courts in the
interpretation of statutes. Under the federal standard after Chevron,
federal courts make two inquiries when a question arises as to an
agency's interpretation of a statute. The first is whether Congress has
addressed the precise question at issue.' If it has, there is no further
inquiry to be made."' The second inquiry is reached only if the court
determines that Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue. 13 In making the second inquiry, the court does not
impose its own interpretation of the statute, but determines whether
105. For example, an agency denies a license on a ground not specified in the agency's
enabling legislation.
106. For example, an agency might issue a license without making a finding of fact that
is a prerequisite to the issuance of the license.
107. See generally 2 COOPER, supra note 78, at 690-701 (analyzing the issues arising
under claims that agencies' actions exceeded statutory authority).
108. 2 see id. at 665.
109. The classic statement on the subject is contained in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134 (1944):
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Admin-
istrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control.
Id at 140 (emphasis added).
110. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
111. Id. at 842.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 843.
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the "agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.
11 4
State courts have not gone that far, although they say they do
accord some "deference" to an agency's interpretation of a statute. 5
Under the APA, North Carolina courts state that some deference
may be given even to an agency's interpretation of statutes, while
alternatively announcing that review of an "error of law" is de
novo.116 Courts might be inclined to accord greater deference to an
agency's interpretation of a statutory term when the meaning of the
114. Id. at 843. See generally 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 3.1-3.6, at 107-31 (3d ed. 1994) (devoting a full
chapter to a discussion of the complications of Chevron). In another context, it has been
pointed out that Chevron has generated a voluminous amount of attention:
To illustrate the significance of Chevron, one need only note the fact that a
Westlaw® check of the unofficial citation, in December 1998, found a total of
7,686 references (with over 350 in the United States Supreme Court) including
dissenting opinions and all other mentions of the case in federal judicial decisions
at all levels. This means that in its fourteen year history, Chevron has been
mentioned annually nearly 500 times.
CHARLES E. DAYE, ET AL., HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 103 (3d ed.
1999).
115. E.g., Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., St. Francis Div. of Children & Family
Servs. v. Thompson, 959 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Ark. 1998) ("Administrative agencies are better
equipped than courts, by specialization, insight through experience, and more flexible
procedures to determine and analyze underlying legal issues affecting their agencies.");
Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 960 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Cal. 1998)
("Agency interpretation of the meaning and legal effect of a statute is entitled to
consideration and respect by the courts."); Sears v. Romer, 928 P.2d 745, 749-50 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1996) ("A reviewing court should generally give deference to the construction of
statutes by administrative officials."); County of Cook v. Ill. Local Labor Relations Bd.,
639 N.E.2d 187, 191 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) ("Courts give substantial weight and deference to
the interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with the administration and
enforcement of that statute."); Belanger v. Warren Consol. Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ., 443
N.W.2d 372, 379 (Mich. 1989) ("Judicial review of agency decisions must be undertaken
with considerable sensitivity in order that the courts offer due deference to administrative
expertise."); Triano v. Div. of State Lottery, 703 A.2d 333, 337 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1997) (stating that due deference is usually accorded to administrative expertise upon
judicial review). Contra Tex/Con Oil & Gas Co. v. Batchelor, 634 So. 2d 902, 907 (La. Ct.
App. 1993) ("Questions of law are to be determined upon judicial review with little or no
deference to the decision of the administrative body.").
116. E.g., In re Appeal of N.C. Say. & Loan League, 302 N.C. 458,466, 276 S.E.2d 404,
410 (1981). The court stated that:
Although the interpretation of a statute by an agency created to administer
that statute is traditionally accorded some deference by appellate courts, those
interpretations are not binding. "The weight of such [an interpretation] in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control.
Id. (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,140 (1944)) (alteration in original).
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term is dependent upon a context in which the agency's experience is
particularly relevant. Statutes that incorporate scientific, medical, or
specialized professional terms, or that use terms of art from a field of
specialized knowledge are candidates for according greater deference
to an agency's interpretation of such terms. Such deference should be
given even when the terms are technically "questions of law" because
they are used in statutory formulations. 7 The special deference is
less applicable to common terms or legal terms for which agency
expertise holds no special relevance.
c. Made Upon Unlawful Procedure
The "made upon unlawful procedure" provision authorizes a
court to reverse or modify an agency's action if it is not in accordance
with the procedural requirements specified in the APA, or with those
required under another statute governing agency procedure. Little
need be said about this standard except to emphasize that
"substantial rights" which "may have been prejudiced" by the
procedural error must exist." 8
d. Affected by Other Error of Law
The "affected by other error of law" standard authorizes a court
to reverse or modify an agency's decision when it is "affected" by an
"error of law" that is not otherwise covered in the specific listed
grounds for reversal or modification." 9 The term "affected" means
that an agency decision is properly subject to reversal or modification
only when an error of law has materially influenced the decision
117. This increased deference could be seen as a "tendency" over a series of cases
within a jurisdiction. See, e.g., Chesapeake Microfilm, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Env't, Health
& Natural Res., 111 N.C. App. 737, 744-45, 434 S.E.2d 218, 221-22 (1993) (holding that
although a court may substitute its own judgment and employ de novo review of an
agency's interpretation of a statutory term, the agency's interpretation of a civil penalty
statute, in particular the phrase "degree and extent of harm," is traditionally accorded
some deference by appellate courts, although those interpretations are not binding); Best
v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 108 N.C. App. 158, 162-63, 423 S.E.2d 330, 332-33
(1992) (stating that even though courts are the final interpreters of statutory terms, the
state board's interpretation of the term "lawfully qualified nurse" in a statute the agency
was created to administer traditionally is accorded some deference). This trend also is
found in cases in which the agency interprets a regulation it administers. See Britt v. N.C.
Sheriffs Educ. & Training Standards Comm'n, 348 N.C. 573, 576, 501 S.E.2d 75, 77 (1998)
(stating that some deference should be accorded to the agency's interpretation of
"conviction" because this term was found in a regulation that the agency was entitled to
administer).
118. See supra notes 65-68, 77-78 and accompanying text (regarding the phrases
"substantial rights" and "may have been prejudiced").
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b)(4) (Supp. 2000).
[Vol. 791600
POWERS OFADMINISTRATIVE LAW
reached. As such, the term appears to be a reverse way of empha-
sizing the harmless error construction that applies to the entire
section.
20
2. Judicial Review of Issues that Tend to be "Fact-Based"
Under the revised APA, two grounds for judicial review are fact-
based: "unsupported by substantial evidence," and "arbitrary or
capricious.' 2' A third ground-"abuse of discretion"-was added in
the amendments that became effective January 1, 2001.12
a. Unsupported by Substantial Evidence
The unsupported by the substantial evidence standard is
concerned with agency decisions in which disputed "adjudicative
facts" are determined. "Adjudicative facts" are facts about the
parties. Generally, they answer the questions of "who did what,
where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent.""lu The practical
distinction of adjudicative facts from other disputed facts for purposes
of the APA generally is that adjudicative facts are those disputed
facts that were the subject of the evidentiary hearing in a contested
case proceeding. 24 Under the standard, the court is authorized to
reverse or modify the decision if the case involves adjudicative facts
and the findings, inferences, conclusions, or the decision as a whole is
unsupported by substantial evidence'5 in view of the "whole record"
that was admissible under the Act. 6
Thus, this provision addresses four aspects of evidence: (1) what
is the "kind" of evidence to which the court's consideration is limited
(or conversely what may not be considered); (2) what "quantum" of
such evidence must be found; (3) where must such evidence be found;
and (4) what method of evaluating evidence must be employed.
120. See supra notes 65-68, 77-78 and accompanying text (regarding the phrases
"substantial rights" and "may have been prejudiced").
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b)(5)-(6) (1999 & Supp. 2000).
122. Id. § 150B-51(b)(6) (Supp. 2000).
123. 2 DAvis & PIERCE, JR., supra note 114, § 10.5, at 141.
124. 2 id. at 141-42.
125. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b)(5) (Supp. 2000).
126. This requirement refers to the official record prepared by the AJL that was before
the agency or that is submitted to the court by the parties in a judicial review proceeding.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-37 (Supp. 2000) (setting forth the requirements for the
content and preparation of the official record in hearings conducted by the AI under
article 3 of the APA); id § 150B-51 (Supp. 2000) (stating the rules for judicial review of
the entire record); see also iU § 150B-29 (Supp. 2000) (governing admissible evidence); id
§ 150B-30 (1999) (governing official notice); id § 150B-31 (1999) (governing stipulations).
16012001]
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As to the kind of evidence, the court is limited to sustaining a
decision on the basis of evidence admissible before the agency under
specified sections of the Act.27 With certain exceptions, the Act
provides that "the rules of evidence as applied in the trial division of
the General Court of Justice shall be followed."'12  The Act
affirmatively requires exclusion of "irrelevant, immaterial, and
unduly repetitious evidence.'
129
Going beyond the mandatory exclusion requirement,
determining the kind of evidence necessary to sustain a decision
becomes much more difficult. However, the current APA, unlike its
predecessor judicial review statute, does not require the exclusion of
"incompetent" evidence, nor does it require "competent" evidence to
sustain an agency decision.' I have argued elsewhere that the full
scale evidentiary limitations governing jury trials are not applicable
on judicial review. 3' I suggested that the requirement that "the rules
of evidence as applied in the trial division"' 32 must mean, at an
irreducible minimum, that agency decisions must be based on
evidence that a trial judge sitting without a jury would be entitled to
rely upon in reaching a decision, as opposed to entitled to admit
during the course of trial.13 Finally, it must be noted that the APA
permits admission of the "most reliable and substantial evidence
127. See id. § 150B-29(a) (Supp. 2000) (governing admissible evidence); id. § 150B-30
(1999) (governing official notice); id. § 150B-31 (1999) (governing stipulations).
128. Id. § 150B-29(a) (Supp. 2000).
129. Id.
130. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318 (1974) (stating that "incompetent" evidence
shall be excluded), replaced by Act of April 12, 1974, ch. 1331, § 2, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws
691,703, with N.C. GEN. STAT § 150B-29 (Supp. 2000) (excluding "irrelevant, immaterial,
and unduly repetitious evidence").
131. Daye, supra note 3, at 917-18.
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-29(a) (Supp. 2000).
133. Daye, supra note 3, at 917-18. The real difference between the rules in civil jury
trials and in trials without a jury is that a trial judge will not be readily reversed for the
admission of evidence that ought to have been excluded. The rule is that notwithstanding
a failure to exclude evidence that was not properly admissible, a rebuttable presumption
exists that excludable evidence was disregarded. See Bizzell v. Bizzell, 247 N.C. 590, 605-
06, 101 S.E.2d 668, 679 (1958); see also General Metals, Inc. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 259 N.C.
709, 712, 131 S.E.2d 360, 362 (1963) (stating that when no evidence appears to the
contrary, appellate courts may assume that the trial judge disregarded any incompetent
evidence that appears in the record); Chappell v. Winslow, 258 N.C. 617, 624, 129 S.E.2d
101, 106 (1963) (holding that there is a rebuttable presumption that a court sitting without
a jury acts only on the basis of competent evidence). Although the harmless error rule
should be applied, it is doubtful that agency decisions as a general matter should be
clothed with a similar presumption.
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available" when evidence under the trial court rules is not reasonably
available."M
As with all rules governing receipt of and reliance upon
evidence, the real concern is that only evidence that has some
probative value should affect the decision or sway the mind of the
factfinder. Given this concern, one is tempted to depart the verbal
thicket, and announce that when a judge reviews an agency decision
with respect to the kind of evidence appearing in the record, the
question is, after all is said and done, whether the record contains at
least some probative evidence (as opposed to simply "competent"
evidence) that can justify the agency's factual finding. 35
A finding that the record contains some of the right kind of
evidence sufficiently probative, standing alone, to justify the findings
is only the first step, however. The next inquiry is whether a
sufficient quantum of evidence supports the findings, in view of other
evidence appearing in the record, to make the findings reasonable.
The APA provides that the evidence should be substantial in view of
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-29(a) (Supp. 2000) (governing admissible evidence in
ALJ-conducted hearings); id. § 150B-41 (1999) (governing admissible evidence in hearings
generally conducted by certain specified agencies without the use of ALJs); cf. G. & C.
Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Publ'g Co., 207 F. 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1913) (quoting then District
Judge Learned Hand, who had been confronted with an offer of hearsay, not apparently
within any exception to the exclusionary requirements for such proof: " 'If this be not
evidence I can see no way of getting any better, and the fact cannot be established at all.
Surely the law is not so unreasonable as that.' ").
135. This, the writer thinks, is not a formulation of the "residuum rule." The N.C. APA
takes two important steps away from that rule: (1) it does not require the exclusion of
"incompetent" evidence, and (2) when evidence admissible under trial court rules is not
reasonably available, it permits admission of the most reliable and substantial evidence
available.
The residuum rule, first announced by the New York Court of Appeals in Carroll
v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 113 N.E. 507, 509 (N.Y. 1916), assumes that only legally
"competent" evidence is probative or reliable. The APA, however, makes no such
assumption, but recognizes: (1) that evidence which does not satisfy jury trial admissibility
rules, depending upon the circumstances, may be probative, and (2) that evidence of a
relatively low probative value may nevertheless tend to support a fact when evidence of
greater probity is not available. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-29(a) (Supp. 2000).
Application of the residuum rule on judicial review would lead to the anomalous result
that an agency's decision would be reversed, without looking at the reasonableness of the
decision in view of all evidence in the record, but merely because the agency had admitted
and based findings upon evidence that did not meet jury trial rules, which, of course, it was
authorized to do under the Act. See id. § 150B-29 (Supp. 2000) (governing admissible
evidence in AL-conducted hearings); id § 150B-41 (1999) (governing admissible evidence
in hearings generally conducted by certain specified agencies without the use of ALJs).
Accordingly, the kind of evidence inquiry under the APA is simply a threshold inquiry
that will permit reversal where no probative or reliable evidence supports a decision. Such
a decision would have to be unreasonable, without regard to the whole record standard of
review, because the record would contain no evidence tending to support a finding of fact.
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the whole record.36 Accordingly, the judge must review all of the
matters that comprise the record.
137
With respect to evaluation of the record to determine whether
the evidence is substantial, it is clear that the court may not substitute
its judgment for the agency's, but must limit itself to the
"reasonableness" of the administrative findings by weighing all of the
evidence in the record.3 ' The North Carolina Supreme Court has
pointed out that under the "whole record test," the reviewing court is
not authorized to replace the agency's judgment when there are two
reasonably conflicting views, even though the court could justifiably
have reached a different result had the matter been before it de
novo.
139
The substantial evidence rule has been criticized as being
unworkable because courts are better able to understand and apply
the "clear error" standard, which appellate courts apply on review of
trial court findings.140 But Justice Frankfurter appears to have been
right in his classic statement: "The precise way in which courts
interfere with agency findings cannot be imprisoned within any form
of words, new formulas attempting to rephrase the old are not likely
to be more helpful than the old. There are no talismanic words that
can avoid the process of judgment.''
However, some guides to the exercise of judgment can be found.
Prior to the APA, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
reviewing court exceeded its scope of review when it substituted its
evaluation of the evidence for that of the agency and found additional
facts the agency had been requested to find but had refused.142 This
holding means that an agency decision that is reasonable from the
standpoint of the evidence cannot be reversed under the substantial
evidence standard, although the court might have found differently if
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b)(5) (Supp. 2000).
137. Id. § 150B-37 (Supp. 2000) (governing the record in ALJ-conducted hearings); id.
§ 150B-42 (Supp. 2000) (governing the record in hearings generally conducted by certain
specified agencies without the use of AI~s).
138. Meads v. N.C. Dep't of Agric., Food & Drug Div., Pesticide Section, 349 N.C. 656,
663, 509 S.E.2d 165, 170 (1998) (stating that if substantial evidence exists in the whole
record to support the agency's decision, then the court must uphold it).
139. Thompson v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 292 N.C. 406, 410, 233 S.E.2d 538, 541
(1977) ("The 'whole record' test does not allow the reviewing court to replace the
[agency's] judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court
could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter been before it de novo.").
140. See 2 COOPER, supra note 78, at 724-29 (discussing the problems associated with
the substantial evidence rule).
141. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,489 (1951) (emphasis added).
142. Clark Equip. Co. v. Johnson, 261 N.C. 269,273, 134 S.E.2d 327,330 (1964).
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it had evaluated the evidence as an initial matter. Similarly, the
North Carolina Supreme Court has reiterated that substantial
evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. "143
As I explained some years ago,144 putting the requirements of
right kind, substantial evidence, and whole record together can
perhaps best be done by illustration. In the course of a proceeding,
the existence or the nonexistence of fact X must be found by the
agency. Witness A, who has no first hand knowledge of fact X, is
offered to testify about what B said to witness A regarding fact X.
Plainly, witness A's testimony is hearsay, but, -depending on the
circumstances, witness A may be permitted to testify to B's statement
if A's testimony falls within one of the exceptions to the hearsay
exclusionary rule. For purposes of admission before the agency,
depending upon the circumstances, A's testimony may be admissible
as the right kind of evidence if it possesses some probative worth.
Suppose further that B's statement tends to support the existence
of fact X. During the course of the proceeding, witness C is produced
and testifies that he bribed B to induce B to make the statement to A.
C produces his cancelled check payable to B as well as B's letter
thanking C for the payment and asserting that the statement
requested has been made to A. The agency finds the existence of fact
X, crediting A's testimony but none of C's.
On judicial review, if one looks only at the part of the record
containing A's testimony, the agency decision finding the existence of
fact X is much more likely to appear to be supported by substantial
evidence, then it appears when C's testimony is examined as well.
Furthermore, in other parts of the record suppose there is testimony
authenticating B's letter, as well as C's cancelled check. Upon
weighing all the evidence, the agency's finding of the existence of fact
X begins to appear unreasonable.
Suppose further, however, that still other parts of the record
contain the testimony of witness D, a psychiatrist, to the effect that C
is a pathological liar,145 the testimony of witness E, a handwriting
expert, that C is a master forger who has faked the alleged letter from
B,146 and the testimony of witness F, a banker, that B paid part of the
143. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Util. Customers Ass'n, Inc., 348 N.C. 452,
460,500 S.E.2d 693,700 (1998); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Bd. of Aldermen, 284 N.C. 458,
470-71,202 S.E.2d 129, 137 (1974).
144. Daye, supra note 3, at 920-21.
145. This evidence would tend to explain why C might make these assertions.
146. This evidence would tend to explain why the letter could have been authenticated
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note he co-signed at the bank for C.147 The agency's finding of the
existence of fact X now begins to appear reasonable.
In sum, the substantial evidence test is one that requires a
weighing and balancing of evidence supporting the decision and
evidence detracting from it. Clearly, upon finding that the decision
appears reasonable, the reviewing court has concluded its work, even
though the judge as an initial matter could or even would have found
otherwise.
b. Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion
The "arbitrary or capricious" standard derives from the original
APA148 and was carried forward in the revised APA.149 The phrase
"abuse of discretion" was added by the amendments that became
effective January 1, 2001.15° The phrase "arbitrary or capricious,"
when applied to contested cases, seems to function as a catchall. It
could operate to mask the real reason the court deems intrusion into
the administrative process to be warranted. As such, it might
encourage less careful reasoning by the courts. Moreover, most
decisions that properly may be classified as "arbitrary or capricious"
will be included under one of the specific and discrete standards
discussed above. 151 What meaning will be accorded to the phrase
"abuse of discretion" remains to be seen. The phrase appears to add
little and may be subject to the considerations that are suggested
below for "arbitrary or capricious."
I have urged that courts reviewing contested cases should use the
"arbitrary or capricious" standard only in those rare instances in
which reversal or modification is necessary because substantial rights
may have been prejudiced, but cannot be justified under the more
specific and discrete criteria authorizing judicial intrusion.'52 This
same reasoning seems to apply to the "abuse of discretion" standard.
Moreover, the North Carolina appellate courts have uniformly stated
that the "whole record" test should apply when the reviewing court
as B's.
147. This evidence would tend to provide an explanation of C's payment to B on
grounds other than bribery.
148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-51(6) (Supp. 1974), replaced by Act of July 12, 1985, ch.
746, sec. 1, § 150A-51, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 987, 1007.
149. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b)(6) (1999), amended by Act of July 12, 2000, ch.
190, § 11, 2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546,551.
150. N.C. GEN. STAT § 150B-51(b) (Supp. 2000).
151. For example, cases not supported by substantial evidence, or in excess of statutory
authority can be broadly described as arbitrary and capricious.
152. Daye, supra note 3, at 921.
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considers an agency decision under the "arbitrary or capricious"
standard.153 This, in turn, means that "arbitrary or capricious" is
treated as a "fact-based" inquiry. As such, the court's authority is
more circumscribed than it is under the "law-based" inquiries, as to
which, the court on judicial review undertakes de novo
consideration. 54
C. The "New" De Novo Review: When the Agency Does Not Adopt
the AIs Decision
The amendments that became effective on January 1, 2001 made
remarkable changes to the standards and scope of judicial review.
The most remarkable change is that now the scope of judicial review
is dependent upon the agency's adoption or rejection of the AI's
decision. Other states have provisions for de novo judicial review of
agency decisions, 55 but research has disclosed no other statute that
bases the standard and scope of judicial review on the agency's
disposition of the ALJ's decision.
1. No Substantial or Partial Adoptions?
Because this is an original approach to judicial review of agency
decisions, it is not perfectly clear what the General Assembly
intended by the phrase "does not adopt" the AU's decision.156 One
question that stands out is whether there is any room between
"adopting" and "not adopting" the AL's decision. This issue arises
153. N.C. Dep't Transp. v. Hodge, 347 N.C. 602, 612, 499 S.E.2d 187, 193 (1998)
(stating that the "whole record" test should be applied when the court considers whether
an agency decision is arbitrary and capricious); Dew v. State ex reL N.C. Dep't of Motor
Vehicles, 127 N.C. App. 309, 310, 488 S.E.2d 836, 837 (1997) (stating that when the
plaintiff questions whether an agency decision was arbitrary or capricious, the "whole
record" test must be applied); In re McCrary, 112 N.C. App. 161, 165, 435 S.E.2d 359, 363
(1993) (holding that if the appellant questions whether the agency decision was arbitrary
or capricious, then the reviewing court must apply the "whole record" test); Walker v.
N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 100 N.C. App. 498, 502, 397 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1990) (stating
that the court must employ the "whole record" test when the issue is whether the agency
decision is supported by evidence, or is arbitrary or capricious).
154. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-22-20(i)-(k) (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-702(a)
(1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 318 (West 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46B-15(1)(a)
(Supp. 2000).
156. The amendment provides the following:
In reviewing a final decision in a contested case in which an administrative law
judge made a decision ... and the agency does not adopt the administrative law
judge's decision, the court shall review the official record, de novo, and shall
make findings of fact and conclusions of law.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(c) (Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
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because agency decisions will contain, as discussed above, findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and the disposition on the merits.157 In
addition, the merits can present multiple issues and several
consequences.
For example, an environmental or licensing decision can find a
violation of a permit or a license and impose penalties ranging from
monetary civil penalties to revocation of the permit. Suppose the
AIL recommends a civil penalty but not a revocation. If the agency
adopts the decision not to revoke the permit, but increases the civil
penalty, does the court review the decision de novo? In other words,
has the agency "adopted" or "not adopted" the AL's decision?
Or, for example, a decision can terminate employment, suspend
employment, effect a demotion, or implement a salary diminution.
Suppose the ALJ recommends back pay for a period between
defective notice of termination and the actual last day on the job, but
approves the termination on its merits. If the agency concurs in the
termination but does not adopt the back pay part of the decision,
what should the court review de novo?
Given that the General Assembly specifically anticipated and set
forth a detailed procedure for an agency to make new findings of fact,
to reject the AL's findings of fact, to make conclusions of law and a
final decision, it seems reasonable that any new findings of fact,
rejection of findings of fact, or refusal to adopt the particular result
set forth in the AL's decision, would be within the phrase "does not
adopt the administrative law judge's decision. "158 This reading would
mean that under the provisions there is no concept of "substantial
adoption" of the ALJ's decision. Rather, every aspect of the ALI's
decision must be adopted, or the agency's decision must be regarded
as one that "does not adopt the administrative law judge's
decision."15 9
Similarly, there does not appear to be any basis for the concept
that an agency has partially adopted the AL's decision. This
inference means that if the agency does not adopt any aspect of the
AL's decision, then the agency's entire decision is subject to de novo
review. Given the detail with which the General Assembly examined
the relations between agencies and ALJs, it would have been easy
enough to include "not adopted in substantial part" or "not adopted
in part." The statute contains no such language. The inference is
157. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.




compelling that the language means what it clearly seems to say:
either an agency has adopted an ALJ's decision or it has not. Any
change the agency makes in the ALJ's decision as to facts,
conclusions, or the merits, surely must permit the strong argument
that the agency did not adopt the ALJ's decision. Moreover, given
the ineffectiveness of the requirement that agencies state reasons for
not adopting the ALJ's decision, it is reasonable to argue that the
General Assembly did not want to introduce gradations of rejection
or adoption apart from the very detailed and specific means it set
forth regarding the disposition of factual findings and the decision on
the merits.160
2. Judicial Review of Agency Decisions De Novo
When an agency has not adopted the ALJ's decision, the
General Assembly specifies exactly what it means by de novo review.
In short, the reviewing court shall not give deference to any prior
decision made in the case and shall not be bound by the findings of
fact or the conclusions of law contained in the agency's final
decision.6
Presumably, this provision makes clear that unlike the de novo
review of questions of law under the traditional standard of review, in
which the court might in some cases give "some deference" even to
questions of law, such deference is not to be given to any aspect of
any prior decision in the case. This broad scope would include the
agency's final decision and the ALJ's decision that the agency
rejected.
In addition, the General Assembly made clear that de novo
review is not limited just to findings of fact or conclusions of law, but
includes the merits of the decision under review. The amendment
states, "The court shall determine whether the petitioner is entitled to
the relief sought in the petition, based upon its review of the official
record."'162 Although the court is not to give deference to prior
decisions in the case, including the ALJ's decision that the agency
rejected, the court, nevertheless, is empowered to adopt the ALJ's
decision under the recent amendments.
163
160. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
161. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(c) (Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
162. Id.
163. The amended statute provides that:
The court reviewing a final decision under this subsection may adopt the
administrative law judge's decision; may adopt, reverse, or modify the agency's
decision; may remand the case to the agency for further explanations under
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All of the new provisions, taken together, have clearly
restructured the relations among ALJs, agencies, and courts. In
addition to increasing the power of ALJs by mandating greater effect
for their decisions, the General Assembly has instructed courts to
substitute their judgments freely in cases in which agencies reject the
ALJs' decisions. Agencies, therefore, must give ALJs' decisions
greater regard, or risk having the courts assess their decisions without
the limited scope of review.
V. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ALJ DECISIONS AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW
As noted at the outset of this Article, the General Assembly has
been attempting to create a fair and workable system of
administrative adjudication. It has been trying to effect precisely the
right balance between the power of governmental agencies to act and
the rights of citizens who are affected by decisions of those agencies
to challenge those decisions. In the preceding Parts of this Article, I
have examined solutions to perceived issues and problems by
attempting to discern the legislative purpose based on an analysis of
the textual and policy grounds as revealed in statutory provisions and
amendments to those statutes. Part V reports the results observed in
a systematic empirical study of agency resolutions of contested cases.
This study was divided into two distinct parts. First, I examined the
pattern of decision-making in the OAH to discern how often
petitioners prevailed before ALJs and how often the AI's decision
was adopted as the agency's final decision.' Second, I analyzed cases
that were subject to judicial review by the North Carolina Court of
Appeals to determine empirical trends in judicial decision-making.
161
Without such a study, only anecdotes exist to explain what might
have been motivating the dissatisfaction with the system that
prompted the most recent amendments. The empirical assessment
probes into what aspects of administrative adjudication were
demanding legislative attention before the most recent amendments
[sections of the APA governing the agency's decision process] ... or reverse or
modify the final decision for the agency's failure to provide the explanations; and
may take any other action allowed by law.
Id. § 105B-51(c) (Supp. 2000). The provisions governing the agency's decision process
include those addressing the agency's reasons for not adopting the AL's finding of facts,
Id. § 150B-36(bl) (Supp. 2000), the agency's reasons for adopting new findings of facts, id.
§ 150B-36(b2) (Supp. 2000), and the agency's reasons for not adopting the decision of the
AUJ, id. § 150B-36(b3) (Supp. 2000).
164. See infra Part V.B. and OAH charts 1-5.
165. See infra Part V.C. and APA study charts 1-13.
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by examining cases in which citizens challenged agencies' decisions by
seeking judicial review.
The results of the empirical analysis of selected cases clearly
demonstrate that citizens might rationally have come to an expression
such as the following: "If you think fighting city hall is tough, then
you haven't seen anything until you try state agencies." First,
agencies prevailed and petitioners lost before ALIs in over three-
quarters of cases."f Second, of the cases in which petitioners
prevailed before ALJs (by securing a favorable recommended
decision), the agencies rejected nearly half of those
recommendations. 7 Third, if petitioners sought judicial review, the
superior court upheld the agencies' decisions in over half of the cases
in which the agency rejected the AUI's recommended decision that
favored the petitioners."" Surprisingly, very similar results could be
observed even if one controlled for selected variables that might be
thought to affect the outcome of judicial review, such as whether the
issue on appeal involved factual findings (with a limited scope of
review) or conclusions of law (with a de novo standard of review). 9
In sum, the empirical study reported below demonstrates that
petitioners, as a class, could have come to the reasoned conclusion
that the prospect of prevailing in a challenge to an adverse agency
ruling was exceptionally limited. They might have believed the deck
was stacked against them. Citizens who had this experience from
their difficulties in the adjudicatory process would then be motivated
to seek legislative action to address the perceived imbalance.
A. Purposes and Limitations of the Study
One can undertake various forms of empirical research designed
to investigate specified phenomena or behavior.170 One purpose of
this study is to discover what actually has happened historically,
revealed by answering, for example, questions such as: What is the
rate at which ALJs make recommended decisions in favor of
petitioners and agencies, respectively? What is the agency rate of
adoption or rejection of the ALJs' recommended decisions? What is
166. See OAH chart 1.
167. See OAH chart 4.
168. See APA study chart 6A.
169. See APA study chart 7 & 8.
170. See generally Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An
Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984 (employing empirical
methodology to examine judicial review of federal administrative action). This work is the
only study found that investigated administrative law issues involving judicial review.
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the rate at which courts affirm, remand, reverse, or modify agency
decisions?
This part of the study collected and analyzed data on the
outcome of contested cases in which the ALJ made a recommended
decision, recording whether the decision was in favor of the petitioner
or the agency. Also, the study collected and analyzed data on the
number of cases in which the agency accepted or rejected the
recommended decision, controlling for whether the decision favored
the petitioner or the agency.
171
A second purpose of the study is to gain insight into the effect
that controlling for selected variables might have on attempting to
inform one's observations about the potential meaning of the
historical observations. In the summer of 1999, I concluded that it
would be an instructive exercise to try to discern whether any
patterns of judicial conduct-deference or intrusion-existed with
respect to agency decisions that were subject to judicial review. Prior
to the amendments that became effective January 1, 2001, with
certain exceptions, ALJs made recommended decisions to
agencies. 7 3 The recommended decisions did not have binding effect,
and could be accepted or rejected by the agency. 4  I decided to
examine whether judicial conduct on review of agency decisions
exhibited discernable differences based on whether the agency
adopted or rejected the AI_'s decision by asking two questions: Do
judicial review outcomes have the same pattern when the agency has
adopted the ALJ's recommended decision (that is, both the ALJ and
171. Of course, the only substantial issue was the rate of adoption of the ALJ's
recommended decision that favored the petitioner because the agency invariably would
adopt a decision against the petitioner that upheld the agency's decision.
172. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36(c) (1999) (describing several types of "final" decisions
made by ALJs), amended by Act of July 12,2000, ch. 190, § 7,2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv.
546, 549; see also, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-759 (a), (bl), (e) (1999) (stating that in an
employment discrimination decision, as a deferral agency for the Federal Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, an order entered by an administrative law judge
after a hearing on the merits of a deferred charge constitutes a final agency decision that is
binding on the parties).
173. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34(a) (1999), amended by Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190,
§ 6, 2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546, 547-48 (deleting the recommended decision
provision).
174. As discussed above, under prior law if the agency did not adopt the ALl's
recommended decision as the agency's final decision, the agency was only required to
"state in its decision or order the specific reasons why it did not adopt the administrative
law judge's recommended decision." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36(b) (1999), amended by
Act of July 12,2000, ch. 190, § 7,2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546,548 (holding agencies to
the more rigorous requirement of stating the reasons for its final decision, instead of
merely stating why the ALl's decision was incorrect).
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the agency agreed) as they do when the agency has rejected the AL's
decision (that is, the ALJ and the agency disagreed)? If one controls
for instances in which the agency adopted the AIJ's recommended
decision and when it did not adopt the AL's recommended decision,
are there any patterns of judicial review outcomes when courts look
at "law-based" issues-as to which the review is de novo-than when
the issues are "fact-based," when the substantial evidence test
constrains judicial review? 7 5  Accordingly, this study examined
various types of ALl decisions to track whether the judicial review
differed: (1) if the agency agreed and adopted the ALI's
recommended decision; or (2) if the agency disagreed and rejected
the ALl's recommended decision. Within each of these two
categories, the study coded data for: (a) whether the decision was
"primarily" for the petitioner; or (b) whether it was "primarily" for
the agency; and (c) whether the decision was "primarily fact-based";
or (d) whether it was "primarily law-based."
Third, and somewhat serendipitously, an additional purpose of
the study developed after the enactment of the 2001 amendments. In
view of the fact that judicial review of decisions in which the agency
did not adopt the AL's decision will be conducted de novo, the study
can be seen as potentially setting up expectations or a mildly
predictive model of future behavior of courts conducting judicial
review under the new regime. But the likely overall difference in the
pre-amendment and post-amendment environment in which judicial
review will be conducted, confounds determination of the predictive
value of the analysis.
Fourth, the study sheds significant light on an external
phenomenon. It demonstrates the low rate at which petitioners
challenging agency action reasonably could expect to succeed at any
level of the administrative process after an agency's action gave rise
to a contested case. This factor, indeed, may have been, and very
likely was, the most powerful force generating constituent pressure on
175. It would also be informative to examine the views of the judges who conduct
substantial amounts of judicial review. But that is beyond the scope of the present study.
The prior version of the APA made Wake County, where most agencies have
their headquarters in the capital city of Raleigh, the venue for most judicial review, except
in limited cases. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-45 (Supp. 1974), amended by Act of July 12,
1985, ch 746, sec. 1, § 150A-51, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 978, 1006. Thus, the superior court
bench in Wake County heard more judicial review matters than judges in other counties
and judicial districts. The APA as revised in 1985 extended the venue, by providing that
venue be Wake County or the petitioner's county of residence. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-
45 (1999) (emphasis added).
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members of the General Assembly to take some measures to effect a
better balance to the system.
Research of this kind is subject to certain inherent limits. These
limitations are discussed in the Appendix to this Article in which I set
forth the methodology employed in attempting to make the analysis
posited. But two major limitations are worthy of note at this point.
First, the data do not account for the merits of the cases that are
examined. Whether petitioners had non-meritorious cases or
whether agencies' decisions were correct on facts and law are not in
any way reflected or evaluated in the study reported here. That is to
say, for example, that the finding that generally petitioners do not
prevail at any level of the post-contested-case system does not permit
any insight or criticism about why the phenomenon exists. Second,
this study does not attempt to discover how many cases were settled
informally between agencies and potential petitioners. There exists,
therefore, no way to know whether the addition of such settled cases
to the cases that reached disposition as contested cases before ALJs
would change the observations about the cases studied.176
176. Although a full description of the methodology for this study is contained in the
Appendix, this footnote sets forth a quick overview. What can analysis of cases tell us? Is
the number of cases too small to show meaningful patterns? I leave that to the reader.
However, I do point out that this study is not based on statistical sampling methodologies.
There can be questions about what the cases represent. There may be factors that could
bias the results one observes, such as resources available to petitioners, the nature or
magnitude of the interests at stake in the dispute, access to legal representation,
adventitious factors that affected whether a petitioner who sought judicial review in
superior court, but did not proceed to the court of appeals, or even the criteria the study
used to determine whether a case would be included. These are surely important factors.
But aside from these factors that might properly cause one to temper the conclusions one
draws, there are no biases in the selection of the cases for the study because all of the cases
in existence that met the study parameters are included in the analysis.
One other factor is worthy of note. All of the cases raised legal issues of
importance to the petitioners and the respondents involved. Each case presented facts
and law that determined the merits of the particular case before the AD, the agency, the
superior court, the court of appeals, and the supreme court. This study does not intend to
denigrate the merits of any case. On the contrary, the author believes that the merits do
matter when assessing outcomes such as those analyzed in the cases. Nevertheless,
impressions of the parties, satisfactions derived after participation, the sense of having had
a day in court, and the sense that the process was fair, though clearly related to the merits
of the case in some objective way, may be central factors motivating a reexamination of
the administrative process in North Carolina and complaints to the General Assembly.
That is to say, impressions matter, distinct from the merits.
Finally, there may well be enough cases to gain insight, however limited, into what
in fact is happening in administrative hearings and what the courts are doing when
conducting judicial review of cases.
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B. The Volume and Pattern of OAH Decisions
Since its inception in 1985 through 1999, the Office of
Administrative Hearings ("OAH") has conducted 3,470
administrative hearings in which an ALU made a recommended
decision to the applicable agency. Of those total decisions, the AIJs'
recommendations favored the agency in 2,631 cases, or 76% of the
time. In other words, agencies prevailed before the OAH in just over
three-fourths of the cases heard by ALJs, while petitioners prevailed
in 839 or 24% of the cases. (See OAH chart 1.)
OAH CHART 1: Total Adoptions of
Recommended Decisions with Proportion for










Total AU AU Decision for AU Decision for
Recommended Agency Petitioner
Decisions
Source: Data supplied by the Office of Administrative Hearings
Of the total cases heard in the OAH, the petitioners sought
judicial review in a much higher percentage of cases in which the ALU
made a recommendation favorable to petitioners (and the agency
rejected the recommendation) than the cases in which the ALU's
recommendation favored the agency (and the agency adopted the
recommendation).,77 In the total volume of cases heard in the OAH,
ALUs rendered decisions in favor of agencies 76% of the time. But,
as set forth below in APA study chart 11,178 in the eighty-four cases
analyzed in this study in which the petitioner sought judicial review,
the ALJ made a recommendation in favor of the petitioner 71% of
the time. One can only speculate as to what might explain the
differences. Such speculation might include that the AUL's
177. The cases heard on judicial review are the subject of the study discussed in the
next section of this Article. See infra Part V.C.
178. See infra Part V.D.
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recommended decision favorable to the petitioner emboldened the
petitioner to seek judicial review, or conversely, the unfavorable
decision discouraged the seeking of judicial review. Moreover, the
petitioners who sought judicial review, as a class, may have had
greater resources than those who did not seek judicial review. For
instance, the petitioners who got favorable decisions may have had
greater interests at stake, or were represented by legal counsel. The
study, however, does not provide a basis to gain insight into these
differences.
When analyzing the rate at which the agencies adopted the ALJs'
recommended decisions, one must keep in mind that 76% of the cases
favored the agency. Thus, of the 3,470 total cases decided by the
OAH, the agencies adopted 2,837, or 82% of the cases. Agencies
partially adopted another 223, or 6% of the cases decided. The
agencies rejected 410 cases, or 12% of the total cases decided. (See
OAH chart 2.)
OAH CHART 2: Total OAH Decisions with Proportion for
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Source: Data supplied by the Office of Administrative Hearings
With proportions such as these, the question naturally arises
concerning what problem might have generated enough heat that the
General Assembly was hearing loud complaints about the futility of
citizens going through the ALJ hearing process.
Recall that agencies, without much restraint from the courts,
could and did reject recommended decisions with which they
disagreed. Therein lies an insight. Of the 2,837 ALJ recommended
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decisions that agencies adopted, 2,432, or 86%, of the cases favored
the agencies. The agencies adopted 405, or only 14%, of the ALJ's
recommended decisions that favored the petitioner. Thus, the small
proportion of decisions that favored the petitioners in the OAH is
one part of the picture. (See OAH chart 3.)
OAH CHART 3: Total Agency Adoptions of
Recommended Decisions with Proportion for Agency











Agency Full Adoptions AU Decision for Agency AU Decision for
Petitioner
Source: Data supplied by the Office of Administrative Hearings
Consider this phenomenon further. The ALJ made a
recommended decision favoring the petitioner in a total of 839 cases.
The agencies adopted 405, or 48%, of the cases. Agencies partly
adopted sixty-five, or 8% of the cases. Agencies rejected nearly as
many cases, 369, or 44% of the total decisional volume in which ALJs
made recommendations favoring petitioners. (See OAH chart 4.)
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OAH CHART 4: Number of ALJ Recommended
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Finally, the last piece of the puzzle can be brought into view. As
could be expected, the most numerous subset of decisions that
agencies reject are those favoring petitioners. The agencies rejected
410 of 3,470 cases, or 12% of the total cases decided in the OAH.
(See OAH chart 2.) But of the 410 cases rejected, 369, or 90%,
favored petitioners. (See OAH chart 5.) The conclusion is that when
citizens have disputes with agencies, their only alternative is to go
through the process of an OAH hearing179 if they desire to seek
judicial review, but can expect to prevail in only 24% of the cases (839
of 3,470 cases). (See OAH chart 1.) Even in the cases in which
petitioners prevail before the OAH, the outcome is uncertain as
agencies reject the ALJs' recommended decisions in nearly half
(44%) of the cases overall (410 of 859 cases), and 90% of the cases in
which petitioners had prevailed (369 of 410 cases). (See OAH chart
5.)
179. Under the exhaustion doctrine, petitioners go through the process of an OAH
hearing if they desire to seek judicial review. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-43 (1999) (stating












OAH CHART 5: Total Agency Rejections with Proportion
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Source: Data supplied by the Office of Administrative Hearings
C. Analysis of the Outcomes on Judicial Review of Agency Decisions
The study analyzed 130 cases that were subject to judicial review
after the creation of the OAH and that reached the court of appeals.
Forty-six of those cases did not fit the basic parameters of the study.180
In order to qualify for the study, a case needed to meet three key
requirements. First, the case had to be subject to an administrative
hearing before an ALL Second, the AL needed the authority to
make a recommended decision that the agency could choose to adopt.
Third, the initial judicial review on the merits of the case needed to be
held in the North Carolina Superior Court. On this basis, of the 130
cases analyzed, eighty-four cases, just under two-thirds (65%), met
the study requirements and parameters. (See APA study chart 1.)
180. See Appendix for further description.
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APA STUDY CHART 1: Net Cases Analyzed in Study
Cases Coded and Coded Cases Not Net Cases In APA Study
Analyzed Applicable
1. Judicial Review When the Agency Adopts the AL's
Recommended Decisions
Of the eighty-four cases studied, the agency adopted the AJ's
recommended decision on the "key issue"'81 in thirty-one, or 37%, of
the cases. Of the thirty-one cases the agency adopted, only seven, or
23%, of the cases were favorable to the petitioner on the key issue.
The thirty-one cases the agency adopted were about evenly divided
between fact-based (fourteen) and law-based (thirteen) issues. Over
all, the superior court affirmed a little better than half of the thirty-
one cases (58%) and reversed slightly less than half (42%). (See
APA study chart 2A.)
181. See Appendix for full description of the "key issue."
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One might have hypothesized that the cases would show a
different pattern of dispositions when both the ALT and the agency
agreed on the result, with the court giving greater credence to that
outcome than in the cases in which the ALJ and the agency
disagreed-that is the agency rejected the ALl's recommendation.
One's theory might be that when a "disinterested" decision-maker
(the ALJ) and a potentially interested entity (the agency) agreed with
the outcome, the greater the likelihood that the court would affirm
this decision. This study does not confirm or support that hypothesis.
When the ALJ and the agency agreed on the result (that is, the thirty-
one cases in which the agency adopted the ALT's recommended
decision), the superior court affirmed the ALJ and the agency in 58%
of the cases and reversed them in 42% of the cases. (See APA study
chart 2B.)
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The agency rejected the ALJ's recommendation in fifty-three of
the eighty-four cases studied. Of the fifty-three cases in which the
ALJ and the agency disagreed-that is, the ALJ recommended one
way and the agency refused to adopt the recommended decision and
decided the case another way-dispositions in superior court follow a
similar pattern. The superior court affirmed the agency in 53% of the
cases and reversed the agency (thus upholding the AU) in 47% of
the cases. (See APA study chart 6A.)







30- 25 025 28 25




Net Cases Ag Fact Law Based Law and Superi Ct Superi Ct
in Study Rejected Based Fact Affirms Ag Upholds
ALJ Rec ALJ
POWERS OFADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The observation is that no distinct pattern exists of a materially
higher reversal rate when the ALJ and the agency disagreed than
when the ALJ and agency agreed. It is unlikely that the 5%
differential in upholding the agencies (58% when the ALJ and agency
agreed versus 53% when they disagreed) can be seen as predicting
superior court dispositions if the only variable known is whether the
ALJ and the agency agreed on the result or not. Therefore, the study
does not support the conclusion that the superior court's disposition
on judicial review is in any way dependent upon the agency's
disposition regarding the ALl's recommended decision.
It is worthy of note, that under the revisions of the APA that
became effective on January 1, 2001, the General Assembly has
determined that if the agency did not adopt the ALJ's decision, then
review in superior court is to be de novo.18 Thus, under the revised
scope and standard of judicial review, a major procedural and
decisional consequence will be mandated dependent on precisely the
question of whether the agency does or does not adopt the ALI's
decision. But, the current pattern of decision-making provides no
basis to predict how dispositions will be made under the new regime.
a. Superior Court Disposition When the Key Issue is a Question of
Law or a Question of Fact
Under the traditional scope of review, courts review questions of
law de novo.183 Review of questions of fact is under the rubric of
"substantial evidence on the whole record."1" Intuitively, one might
regard de novo review as more likely to result in a reversal because a
court needs merely to disagree with the agency's conclusions and is, at
least in theory, free to substitute its judgment for the agency's.
Conversely, one might think a court would not reverse a finding of
fact or substitute its judgment if the agency's conclusion was
"reasonable," even if the court disagreed with the matter, and would
have reached a different finding if it were considering the matter
initially.
The findings of the study are counterintuitive to this suggestion.
When the agency adopted the ALI's recommended decision, the
superior court affirmed and reversed fact-based decisions at an equal
182. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(c) (Supp. 2000).
183. See, e.g., Staton v. Brame, 136 N.C. App. 170, 174, 523 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1999)
(stating that courts review questions of law de novo).
184. Williams v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 318 N.C. 441, 448, 349 S.E.2d 842, 847 (1986)
(holding that the whole record test is the preferred method for reviewing questions of
fact).
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rate (50% were affirmed and 50% were reversed). (See APA Study
chart 3.) Even more strikingly, when the agency adopted the ALJ's
recommended decision the superior court affirmed 77% of the cases
that were law-based, while reversing only 23%. (See APA study
chart 4.)
APA STUDY CHART 3: Agency Adopted ALJ
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b. Court of Appeals Disposition When the Agency Adopts the ALJ's
Recommended Decision
When the agency adopted the ALI's recommended decision, the
court of appeals upheld the agency and ALU (who, by definition, had
agreed on the outcome) in 52% of the cases, while reversing 42% of
[Vol. 791624
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the cases. Of the sixteen cases upholding the ALJ and the agency, the
court of appeals reversed the superior court in five cases. It affirmed
or reversed in part, or remanded only two cases. (See APA study
chart 5.)
APA STUDY CHART 5: Agency Adopted Recommendation-












Cases Ag Adopts CA Upholds CA Rev's CAA/R part, CA Upholds
Included in ALJ Rec ALJ/Ag ALJ/Ag Remand ALJ/Ag;
Study Rev's Sup Ct
2. Judicial Review When the Agency Does Not Adopt the ALJ's
Recommended Decision
Of the eighty-four cases in the study, the agency did not adopt
the AI's recommended decision ("rejected") on the key issue in 53
cases (or 63% of the time). Remarkably, the key issue involved in
twenty-five, or 47%, of the cases was a fact-based issue and in twenty-
five, or 47%, the key issue was law-based. (See APA study chart 6A.)
The superior court decided 53% of the cases in favor of the
agency's disposition and 47% of the cases in favor of the ALJ's
recommended disposition that the agency had rejected. (See APA
study chart 6B.)
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Net Cases in Study Ag Rejected ALJ Superi Ct Affirms Superi Ct Upholds
Rec Ag ALJ
This result demonstrates that the superior court affirms the
agency, even when it has rejected the ALJ's recommendation, about
half the time. The superior court similarly reverses the agency, thus
affirming the ALJ, about half the time.
The finding that when the agency rejected the ALl's
recommendation the superior court upheld the agency and the ALT
with approximately the same frequency (the agency, 53% of the time
versus the AU, 47% of the time) is difficult to interpret. One might
have hypothesized a higher agency reversal rate (that is upholding the
ALJ) when the ALJ and the agency disagreed. But the study does
not support the hypothesis that the courts are giving decisive weight
to the ALJs as disinterested, neutral decision-makers. Conversely,
the study does not support the view that the superior courts are giving
weight to agencies' outcomes either, as well they might if one accepts
the notion that agencies, at least in theory, have greater expertise.
a. Superior Court Disposition Depending on Whether the Key Issue
is a Question of Law or a Question of Fact
In the cases in which the agency has rejected the ALl's
recommended decision, one can similarly seek to determine if any
patterns exist based on whether the key issue was fact-based or law-
based. As in the cases in which agencies adopted the ALJs'
recommended decisions, the cases do not confirm the hypothesis that
law-based cases might be reversed at a greater frequency than fact-
based cases. (See APA study chart 7 & 8.)
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APA STUDY CHART 7: Agency Rejected ALJ
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As can be seen, when the issues are fact-based, the superior court
affirms the decision, thus upholding the agency's rejection of the
ALl's recommended decision, 48% of the time, while reversing the
agency, and thus upholding the ALl, in 52% of these cases. Four
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When the issues are law-based, the results are similar. Of the
cases in which the agency rejected the ALJ's recommended decision,
the superior court affirmed the agency in 52% of the cases, and
reversed the agency, thus upholding the ALJ, in 48% of the cases. If
any insight is to be gained here, it is the counterintuitive conclusion
that the rate of affirmance is marginally higher in law-based cases
than in fact-based ones. But the four percentage point differential
would not yield any reliable prediction of the likely outcome of
superior court judicial review of agency decisions based on whether
the key issue in the case was fact-based or law-based.
b. Court of Appeals Disposition When the Agency Did Not Adopt
the ALJ's Recommended Decision
When agencies rejected ALJs' recommended decisions,
remarkably, the court of appeals disposition was divided equally
between upholding the agency and upholding the AJ, with each
disposition being made in 47% of the cases. In the remaining 6% of
the cases (three cases), the court of appeals affirmed in part and
reversed in part. (See APA study chart 9.)
APA STUDY CHART 9: Agency Rejected AL
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3. Judicial Review in the Supreme Court
Only fourteen, or 17%, of the eighty-four cases studied reached
a disposition in the North Carolina Supreme Court. Of those cases,
[Vol. 791628
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the only insight the data seem to permit is that agencies were upheld
43% of the time when they rejected the recommended decisions of
AIJs. In contrast, AIJs were upheld 29% of the time in those cases.
(See APA study chart 10.)
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D. The Bottom Line: Petitioners Normally Do Not Prevail in the
Adminstrative Process
If there is any observation that one can make as a result of the
study, the observation is that it is very difficult for petitioners to
prevail in the administrative process. This may well have fueled the
concerns legislators were hearing that eventually lead to the
amendments that became effective on January 1, 2001.
First, most petitioners lose before the ALJ. Only 24% of cases
disposed of in the OAH are decided in favor of petitioners. (See
OAH chart 1.) However, that is just part of the story. Of the total
volume of cases that reached disposition in the OAH (3,470), only
130 advanced to the court of appeals. Eighty-four of these 130 cases
are included in this study under the conditions that limited the types
of cases analyzed." Therefore, of the total OAH dispositions (3,470
185. Some cases could have ended in superior court without appeal to the court of
appeals and are not included in the study. But in light of the fact that cases can be
appealed as of right from superior court to the court of appeals, one can speculate that
there was not a particularly significant diminution of cases. Petitioners might have been
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cases), only eighty-four, or 2.4%, of the cases are analyzed in this
study. But these cases are not a sample. They represent the entire
universe of applicable cases that were disposed of in the court of
appeals. Quite literally, the cases studied are all the cases that exist.
In contrast to the pattern of cases disposed of in the OAH, in
which petitioners prevailed only 24% of the time, of the cases that
reached decision in the court of appeals and thus are included in this
study, the petitioners prevailed before the OAH 71% of the time. But
the agencies rejected the ALJ's recommendation in 88% of those
cases. Put differently, the agencies adopted the AJ's key
recommendation in only seven, or 12%, of the sixty cases in which the
ALJ's recommendation favored the petitioner. (See APA study chart
11.)
APA STUDY CHART 11: Agency Rejection/Adoption
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From a different perspective, the petitioner's chance of success
appears even less likely. This study included eighty-four cases. The
agencies adopted the ALJs' recommended decisions in thirty-one, or
37%, of the cases. Of those thirty-one cases, only seven, or 23%,
favored petitioners. (See APA study chart 12.)
deterred if the court sustained the agency. In contrast, the agency might not have
appealed an adverse decision in superior court. These are all imponderable matters.
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APA STUDY CHART 12: Agency Rejection/Adoption
Rate When Disposition is for Petitioner
7-23%
Net Cases In Study Ag Adopts ALJ Rec AU Rec for Petitioner
Finally, consider the total picture. Of the eighty-four cases
studied, the agencies rejected the ALJs' recommended decisions in
63% of the cases. The agencies adopted the ALJs' recommended
decisions in thirty-one, or 37%, of the cases. But, of the thirty-one
cases in which the agencies adopted the ALJs' recommended
decisions, twenty-four, or 29% of the total cases, favored the agency.
This analysis demonstrates that of the eighty-four cases studied,
petitioners prevailed before both the ALU and the agency only seven
times, or a somewhat small 8% of the cases. (See APA study chart
13.)
APA STUDY CHART 13: Agency Adoption/Rejection
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Exactly why petitioners do not prevail at a greater rate cannot be
determined. Any number of hypotheses might be advanced. One
hypothesis is that the North Carolina agencies correctly found facts
and properly applied the law when they had disputed matters to
resolve. Another possibility is that the OAH dispositions
demonstrate bias in favor of agencies. Perhaps the courts do not
properly keep agencies in check by applying rigorous judicial review.
It is also possible that petitioners did not have adequate resources to
effectively pursue their cases in the OAH and on judicial review.
There are undoubtedly other possible hypotheses. Regrettably,
nothing in the study reported here confirms or refutes any of these
possible theories.
Nevertheless, it would not necessarily amount to unwarranted
speculation to suggest that this study demonstrates that nearly all of
the petitioners may have left the administrative process with a feeling
of futility about the efficacy, if indeed not also about the fundamental
fairness, of the administrative process. This is the process that
empowers agencies to affect the rights and property of citizens. This
is the process that requires petitioners to participate in a hearing in
the OAH, where they lose 76% of the time, before they may even
seek judicial review. This sense of futility could only have been
compounded when the case reached judicial review. The data do not
show that petitioners seeking judicial review had a sufficient
likelihood of prevailing to give petitioners, as a class, who were
disappointed with the outcome before the agency, any feeling that
they had been heard effectively in court. Accordingly, they might
have come away from the entire process thinking that the deck was
stacked against them from the outset.
One could also reason that some of these petitioners had enough
energy and influence to make a case to their legislative
representatives. Whether the General Assembly's latest attempt to
adjust the administrative process in the recent amendments will prove
effective at ameliorating what might have generated something of an




Description of the APA Study Empirical Analysis and
Methodology
To conduct this empirical analysis of judicial review of
administrative agency decisions in North Carolina, I researched all
opinions that were subject to judicial review in the North Carolina
Court of Appeals, in which the court issued a published opinion that
involved the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act.186 I then
identified all cases that arose after the creation of the Office of
Administrative Hearings in 198511 and included all decisions through
the end of the year 1999. The first cases to reach decision in the court
of appeals were decided in 1988.
The first level of judicial review is in superior court. 88 But
superior courts do not have published decisions. The legislation that
created the OAH was enacted in the same year that the APA was
amended to set the venue for judicial review in the county in which
the petitioner resided, as well as in Wake County. 9 That means that
judicial review decisions may be rendered in any of North Carolina's
one hundred counties. Research of all superior court decisions,
therefore, would prove to be extremely daunting, if not impossible as
a practical matter. Thus, researching the cases in the court of appeals
was dictated by practical reality.
Every case included in the study contained a statement of the
procedure involved in the proceeding, whether an AL had made a
recommended decision, whether the agency had adopted the
recommendation or not, and the disposition in the superior court on
judicial review. Of the cases that met the criteria stated above, only
cases in which the ALT was making a recommended decision are
included. The limited number of cases in which the ALJ had final
decision-making authority that was binding are not included in the
study.'9
186. A complete file of all cases, with notations of the coding decisions, is maintained
in the office of the author.
187. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-750 to -759 (1999 & Supp. 2000).
188. Id. § 150B-45 (1999).
189. Id. § 150B-45 (Supp. 1974), amended by Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 746, § 1, 1985
N.C. Sess. Laws. 987, 1006 (stating that a petitioner may seek judicial review in either
Wake County or the superior court of the county where the petitioner resides).
190. See id. § 150B-36(c) (Supp. 2000); see also id. § 7A-759(e) (1999) (stating that
ALJs shall have final authority in certain employment discrimination cases).
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In addition, the study included only those cases arising in
agencies that are subject to the APA. Thus, no cases are included
involving agencies that are exempt entirely from the APA'9' or from
agencies that are either exempt from the contested case provisions'
92
or exempt from provisions requiring the use of an ALJ to make a
recommended decision. 3  Also, no cases are included involving a
procedural issue, such as a record insufficient to permit judicial
review when that issue was not dispositive of a key issue on the merits
of the dispute. 94
In a few cases that were not included in the study, collateral
issues, such as attorney's fees, were the focus of judicial review. 95
Other cases were not included in the analysis because the cases, or a
step in a proceeding in the cases, did not involve a final disposition on
the merits.96
Some cases do not have initial judicial review in superior court.
Examples of these are cases involving certificates of need for a health
care facility. These cases go from the agency directly to the court of
appeals, 97 although ALJs do make recommended decisions in such
cases. 8 None of these cases are included in the study. Additionally,
cases that reached the court of appeals in which the court did not
finally dispose of the case or did not resolve the case on its merits are
excluded from the empirical analysis.
A case can involve an agency as the "petitioner" against another
agency. These cases are included in the study. An example of this
situation can be found in a case in which the Secretary of Labor seeks
judicial review of a decision of the Safety Health and Review Board
that adopted an ALI's recommendation to dismiss the citation of a
191. Id. § 150B-l(c) (Supp. 2000).
192. Id. § 150S-l(e) (Supp. 2000).
193. Id. §§ 150B-38 to -42 (Supp. 2000) (covering hearings conducted by article 3A
occupational licensing agencies and certain other specified agencies).
194. See, e.g., Sutton v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 132 N.C. App. 387, 388-89, 511 S.E.2d
340, 341-42 (1999) (vacating and remanding the superior court's order due to the fact that
there was insufficient evidence to determine whether the proper scope of review was
undertaken).
195. See, e.g., Walker v. N.C. Coastal Res. Comm'n, 124 N.C. App. 1, 1-12,476 S.E.2d
138, 138-45 (1996) (adjudicating an issue related to the awarding of costs and counsel
fees).
196. For example, cases remanded for further proceedings of a preliminary nature
were not included in the analysis. See, e.g., Midway Grading Co., Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of
Env't, Health & Natural Res., Div. of Land Res., 123 N.C. App. 501, 504-06, 473 S.E.2d
20, 21-23 (1996) (remanding the case to the superior court because the agency's service of
process did not comply with the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure).
197. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-188(b) (1999).
198. Id. § 131E-188(a) (1999).
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company that arose from the electrocution of a plant employee by an
arc welder.199
Once I made a decision that the case met the procedural and
analytical parameters I established, I then coded the cases to yield a
count of selected issues I wanted to examine.
Cases were coded in one series of codes to count whether the
"agency accepted the result the ALJ recommended." The legend on
the charts produced from these data states this criterion as: Ag
Adopts ALJ Result. (See APA study chart 2A.)
Second, cases were coded to count those in which the "agency
rejected the result the ALJ recommended." The legend on the charts
produced from these data states this criterion as: Ag Rejected ALl
Result. (See APA study chart 6A.)
Next, with respect to cases coded as being within either of the
two criterion groups, cases within each group were coded to yield a
count as to whether the ALJ made a recommended decision on the
"key issue ' 2°° in favor of the "petitioner."20 1 Following the result
code, the cases were coded according to the key issue being decided.
This codification took three forms: "primarily" fact-based,
"primarily" law-based, or involving multiple issues of law and fact.
The legends on the charts produced for these data states: "Key Issues
Fact Based," "Key Issues Law Based," and as involving "Law and
Fact." (See APA study charts 2A & 6A.)
A few cases involved both fact-based issues and law-based issues.
These cases required a judgment call as to which was the primary
issue." In a few cases, the fact-based issues and the law-based issues
199. Brooks v. BCF Piping, Inc., 109 N.C. App. 26, 28-29, 426 S.E.2d 282, 283-84
(1993) (stating that the Commissioner of Labor sought judicial review of the Safety Health
& Review Board's decision to adopt the ALJ's recommended judgment).
200. "Key issue" was operationally defined, in the sense that I made a judgment about
the nature of the case. For example, if a suspension of a license and a civil penalty were
involved, and the petitioner got the penalty reduced but the suspension was imposed, the
"key issue" would be classified as the suspension. If the petitioner was appealing a civil
penalty and the penalty was substantially reduced, then the case was coded as one in which
the petitioner prevailed on the "key issue." In cases of multiple issues, I made a judgment
call as to which issue would very likely be regarded as "most essential" to the petitioner.
For example, if both back pay and a position were involved and petitioner got some back
pay but the termination was upheld, the case was coded as one in which the petitioner did
not prevail.
201. The designation of petitioner was determined based on the posture of the parties
before the ALI.
202. For example, in Yates Constr. Co., Inc. v. Comm'r of Labor, 126 N.C. App. 147,
484 S.E.2d 430 (1997), an employer was found in violation of safety standards and
appealed. Id. at 149-50, 484 S.E.2d at 431-32. The employer alleged that the agency had
not properly interpreted "upper-landing surface" language in the statute, a law-based
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seemed to play equally important roles or could not be disentangled
to yield a discrete basis for the court's decision. I coded those cases
as having multiple issues of law and fact.
Generally, when the final reviewing court conducted a whole
record test to determine whether the prior decision was either
unsupported by the evidence or arbitrary and capricious, I coded that
as a primarily fact-based decision. When the final reviewing court
conducted de novo review to determine whether the decision
contained errors of law, I coded that as a primarily law-based
decision.
Next, the cases within a criterion group were coded as to the
result in the superior court on judicial review. The results were coded
first on cases in which the agency adopted the ALJ's recommended
decision, as affirmed, reversed, or modified. The legend on the charts
produced from these data states: "Superi Ct Affirms ALJ/Ag;" or
"Superi Ct Rev's ALJ/Ag." (See APA study charts 2A, 3, 4, & 5.)
Following this step, the cases next were coded to count dispositions in
the court of appeals. The legend on the charts produced from these
data states: "CA Upholds ALJ/Ag;" "CA Rev's AU/Ag;" "CA A/R
part, remand;" and "CA Upholds ALJ/Ag; Rev's Sup Ct." (See APA
study chart 5.)
With respect to cases in which the agency did not adopt the
AL's recommended decision, the cases were also coded to count
which cases were affirmed, reversed, or modified. The legend on the
charts produced from these data states: "Superi Ct Affirms Ag;"
"Superi Ct Rev's; Upholds AU." (See APA study chart 6A.)
Following this step, the cases were coded to count dispositions in the
court of appeals. The legend on the charts produced from these data
states: "CA Upholds Ag;" "CA Upholds ALJ;" "CA Modified Ag;"
"CA Aff/Rev part." (See APA study chart 9.)
The few cases that reached the North Carolina Supreme Court
are coded by result in APA study chart 10. For those in which the
agency adopted the ALJ's recommended decision, the cases are
coded by that result. The legend on the charts states: "Agency/ALJ
Upheld" or "Agency/ALJ Rev'd." For the cases in which the agency
issue. Id. at 150-51,484 S.E.2d at 432. Additionally, the employer alleged that even if the
agency interpreted the statute correctly, the employer was not in "serious violation," a
fact-based issue. Id. at 152, 484 S.E.2d at 433-34. The court of appeals addressed each
allegation, but did not find significant merit in the employer's law-based allegation. See id.
at 150-52, 484 S.E.2d at 432-33. The decision, which ultimately was against the employer,
seemed primarily determined on the fact-based issue, and thus I coded it as such. See id.
at 152-54,484 S.E.2d at 433-34.
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rejected the ALJ's recommended decision, the decisions are similarly
coded by result. The legend on the chart states: "Agency Upheld,"
"ALJ Upheld," and whether the case was "Modified" or
"Remanded."
APA study chart 11 displays instances in which the eighty-four
cases coded were cases in which the AJ's recommendation favored
the petitioner on the key issue, "ALJ Rec for Petitioner," and it then
sets forth the proportion of these cases in which the agency did not
adopt the AUJ's recommendation ("Agency Rejected ALJ Rec") and
the cases in which the agency adopted the ALJ's recommendation on
the key issue ("Agency Accepted ALJ Rec").
APA study chart 12 sets forth the proportion of the cases coded
in which the agency adopted the ALJ's recommended decision and
shows what proportion of those, on the key issue, favored the agency
("Ag Adopts ALJ Rec"), and which favored the petitioner ("AIJ
Rec for Petitioner").
APA study chart 13 sets forth the overall pattern that can be
observed in the cases coded. It puts together the data displayed in the
two previous charts. Of the eighty-four cases coded, the agency
rejected the ALJ's recommendation in 63% of the cases ("Agency
Did Not Adopt ALJ Rec"). The agency adopted the AI_'s
recommended decision in 37% of the eighty-four cases, but 29% of
the adopted cases favored the agency ("ALJ Rec Favored Agency")
and only 8% of the cases studied that the agency adopted favored the
petitioner ("ALJ Rec Favored Petitioner").
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